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JAPANESE EQUITY FINANCING WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES
JOHN B. CHUSTENSJN*
General. Japanese industry since the war has been characterized
by a very high rate of growth and a severe shortage of equity capital.
Given the attractions of this high growth rate coupled with the political
and economic stability of the country, it was natural that foreign
equity investment would be attracted to Japan. This is particularly
true in view of the disturbed conditions existing in other capital-short
areas of the world and the recent stagnation in investment demand in
the United States, the largest exporter of capital.
This mating of supply with demand has not been without its
difficulties, however. The very need for capital resulted in measures
such as foreign exchange control and outright limitations on foreign
investment, all designed to harbor what local capital was available.
Furthermore, on the private plane differences in legal systems and
concepts posed private law problems not found elsewhere to the same
degree. The past two years, however, has seen the solution or ameliora-
tion of many of these problems as evidenced by the successful issue in
the United States of equity securities1 by a number of Japanese
companies.2
*A.B., Princeton, 1947; LL.B., Yale, 1950; admitted to New York Bar, 1951, and
Tokyo Bar, 1952; co-author of "Tax Incentives for Industry in Mexico," Harvard
International Program in Taxation, 1959; partner, Mclvor, Kauffman & Christensen,
1962.
1 For purposes of this article equity securities include, in addition to stock, debt
securities with equity features such as convertible debentures, participating debentures,
etc.
2 The companies and their issues are as follows:
Number
Company Security shares Amount Date
Sony Corporation common stock 2,000,000 $3,500,000 June 1961
Mitsubishi Chemical common stock and
Co., Ltd. notes jointly 2,047,385 5,200,000* Nov. 1961
Tokyo Shibaura Electric common stock 30,000,000 9,300,000 Feb. 1962
Co. Ltd. (Toshiba) convertible
Hitachi, Ltd. debentures .................. 16,500,000 Sept. 1962
Shin Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries Co., Ltd. ".................. 10,000,000 Sept. 1962
Toshiba "................. 20,000,000 Dec. 1962
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. common stock 9,000,000 21,775,000 Dec. 1962
Nippon Electric Co., Ltd. " 10,000,000 6,700,000 Feb. 1963
Kansai Electric Power
Co., Ltd. " 13,000,000 -21,775,000 Mar. 1963
Sony Corporation common stock 3,000,000 6,000,000 Apr. 1963
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It is the purpose of this article to describe the economic and legal
background of these issues and the legal problems encountered.
Economic Background. Japan emerged from the war with its
industrial plant shattered and inflation rampant, with prices rising to
more than 300 times the prewar level.! With their plants in ruins and
capital wiped out by inflation, Japanese industrialists had to look to
the government for funds to reconstruct. The Bank of Japan, through
the emergency Reconstruction Finance Bank, made huge loans to
industry which could not be repaid in the face of spiraling costs.'
Conditions left no choice; private investment was paralyzed.' Sound
finance had to give way in the face of the elemental need to survive.
To add to the difficulty, the Occupation reforms profoundly disturbed
the old financial structure. There was a separation of ownership from
management which left management with little understanding of, and
cut off from, the traditional source of equity funds. Occupation
strictures against inter-company stock holdings and limitations on
holdings by financial institutions also had their effect. All of this
coupled with a low rate of personal savings on the part of individuals
who were also hard pressed to survive took its toll.6 Last but not least
was the dissolution of the Zaibatsu, the name given to the prewar busi-
ness combinations and trusts which dominated so much of Japan's
industry, trade and finance. Until the end of the war, the capital
requirements of large corporations were met almost entirely by means
Number
Company Security Shares Amount Date
common stock
and convertible
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. debentures jointly 2,500,000 12,000,000"* Apr. 1963
* of which $4,425,000 was the face amount of the notes.
** of which $10,000,000 was the principal amount of the convertible debentures.
Except in the case of Mitsubishi Chemical, which was a private placement, all the
common stock issues were evidenced by American Depositary Receipts. ADRs were
also made available for common stock in connection with the Shin Mitsubishi con-
vertible debentures. ADRs were already available from the previous stock offering in
the case of the Toshiba convertible debenture issue, while Hitachi was a private
placement.
3 COHEN, JAPAN'S POSTWAR ECONOMY 12, 13, 83 (1958).
4 Id. at 84, 85.
5 Japanese stock exchanges were closed in August, 1945 and not reopened until
May, 1949.GFor a catalogue of adverse factors including these and others, see Matsui,
Shokenkai no TOinen no Mondai id tsuite-Shoken Torihiki Shingikai no Gidai o
Chushin ni (Problems Facing the Securities World-Centering on the Agenda of the
Securities Exchange Council), 143 SHoji Homu KENKYU (Commercial Law Journal,
hereinafter referred to as CLJ) 2, (June 25, 1959). See also, REPORT TO THE MINISTRY
OF FINANCE OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COUNCIL (June 22, 1960), as reported in
Zoshi no Sokushin ni tsuite (Concerning the Promotion of Capital Increase), 181
CLJ 2, (July 1, 1960).
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of the issuance of shares to carefully selected subscribers, usually
either the banks of Zaibatsu combines or the Zaibatsu combine holding
companies. With these sources removed, equity funds dried up.
With the return of relative stability in 1949 and 1950, with the
drastic reforms of the Dodge Mission and with the stimulus to indus-
trial activity provided by the outbreak of the Korean War, the finan-
cial structure of Japanese industry was profoundly different from pre-
war and from that currently prevailing in other advanced countries.
The crisis of the 1940's left a mark which has continued to the
present day.
Direct borrowings from the government abated to be replaced by
borrowings from commercial banks which in turn availed themselves
of the rediscount facilities of the Bank of Japan. The result was that
as recently as the latter 1950's reliance on commercial banks was
proportionately 13 times as great as in the United States.'
Put another way, Japanese industry was operating on a thin margin
of equity investment, putting it at the mercy of every twist and turn
of government monetary policy and affording little opportunity for
long range planning. A few figures will serve to dramatize the situa-
tion. In the 1934 to 1936 period debt was 33.5% and equity 66.5%
of capital, whereas in 1958 the situation was reversed with equity down
to 34% and debt up to 66%.' Comparison with other countries left
little room for complacency. Even war-torn West Germany had an
equity-debt ratio higher than Japan's while, as was to be expected,
England and the United States were much higher, 40 to 60 in the case
of the first, 64 to 36 in the case of the second and 66 to 34 in the case
of the third.9
7 COHENR, op. cit. supra note 3 at 127.
s Matsui, supra note 6.9 Tsuneda, Keiki Choseiki ni okeru Zoshi no Arikata (Method of Capital Increase
in Period of Business Adjustment), 227 CLJ 2, (Nov. 15, 1961). See 7 The Japan
Stock Journal, No. 303, (Feb. 18, 1963), at 8, where under the heading "Competitive
Power" the following figures for specific Japanese and comparable foreign companieg
in the same industry are given:
Percentage of Percentage of
Company owned capital Company owned capital
Steel producers: Automobile makers:
Ya-ata (Japan) 33.6% Nissan Motor (Japan) 29.2%
U.S. Steel (U.S.) 71.4 Fiat (Italy) 86.9
Tube Investment (Britain) 69.4 General Motors (U.S.) 74.2
Chemical firms: British Motor (Britain) 50.4
Sumitomo Chemical (Japan 27.8% Electrical manufacturers:
Du Pont (U.S.) 93.9 Hitachi (Japan) 27.2%
ICI (Britain) 71.8 A. E. I. (Britain) 62.4
Montecatini (Italy) 602 General Electric (U.S.) 58.9
Bayer (West Germany) 40.7 A. E. G. (West Germany) 45.4
1963]
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An analysis of the composition of the debt of Japanese companies
is also revealing. Of the 66% figure for debt, 21% is short term loans.
Only 3% is debentures, showing the small participation of the long
term investing public as opposed to banks, on the debt side of the
ledger. 0 The poor showing of Japanese equity investment is in con-
trast to all other indicators. With 100 as the prewar (1934-1936)
base indicator, by 1958 per capita national income was 174; bank
deposits, 142; loans, 184; and paid up share capital, only 30."
Recent trends have not been encouraging. A survey of capital pro-
curement in the years 1957 to 1959 showed that of new funds ob-
tained by all juridical persons, equity accounted for only 33.6%. Of
this, new stock issues accounted for only 11% with the balance being
made up out of retained earnings and depreciation. Of the 66.4%
representing debt, 42.3% was short term and 22.1% was long term,
of which only 3.7% represented bonds and debentures. 2
Compared with these figures the statistics of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange during the first decade of its postwar operation, while im-
pressive, give scant comfort."3 By 1960, with Japan standing on the
threshold of trade and capital transactions liberalization, and with
10 Matsui, supra note 6. The debenture market continues weak with the result that
this type of security has little appeal to the investing public. See on this problem,
Kisai Shijo Kakudai no Kihon Mondai (Basic Problems of Enlarging the Bond Issue
Market), 154 CLJ 2, (Oct. 15, 1959). REPORT OF THE SECURITIEs EXCHANGE COUNCI.
(Nov. 17, 1959) meeting in Shasai Shijo Ikusei no tame no Tomen no Mondai ni tsuite
(Concerning Problems Facing the Development of a Bond Market), 158 CLJ 16,(Nov. 25, 1959). The principal purchasers of bonds and debentures are the banks
leaving the issuers equally dependent on the banks as in the case of bank loans, ibid.
This is all the more true in view of the relatively short maturities of Japanese bonds
and debentures, generally only seven years, OKAMURA, KABusuiKi KAISHA KINYU
No KENKYU (Study of Corporate Finance) 356 (Rev. Ed. 1962). See Maeda, Saikin
no Shcsai Shijo ni okern Sho Mondai (Various Problems in the Present Bond Mar-
ket), 214 CLJ 2, (June 15, 1961), which points out that only 11 bond and debenture
issues are listed on an exchange.
11 Matsui, supra note 6.
12 Oguma, Shihon Kosei Zesei no Tame no Tomen no Hosaku (Urgent Policy for
Improvement of Capital Structure), 200 CLJ 5, (Dec. 25, 1960/Jan. 5, 1961).
13 Upon the reopening of the Stock Exchange in May, 1949 there were 485 com-
panies listed with a total capital of 357 billion represented by 1.1 billion shares out-
standing. Ten years later there were 559 companies listed with a total capital of
Y1,210 billion represented by 21.5 billion shares outstanding. Daily transactions rose
from 1.33 million shares in 1949 to 39 million shares in 1958 for a 30-fold increase,
Chairman of the Board of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in Shoken Torihikijo Junen no
Kaiko to Tembo (Review of Ten Years of the Stock Exchange and Prospects),
135 CLJ 2, (April 5, 1959). On the other hand, in the middle of 1962 the market value
of all stock of the 833 companies listed on the First Section of the Exchange came to
only slightly more than $16 billion or less than 5% of the $330 billion for the issues on
the New York Stock Exchange, on the basis of which it is said, "The clear inference is
that Japanese corporations are badly undercapitalized, by 50% or more by American
or European standards," according to an astute article, "Japan's Complex Monetary
Structure--Business Walks Tightrope of Chronic Money Shortage and Overstretched
Borrowings to Maintain Operations," 2 The Investor No. 20, 1, 2 (Sept. 27, 1962).
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the resultant competition from foreign imports and the challenge and
opportunity presented by the prospect of ever larger foreign invest-
ments, remedial action was called for. The postwar period was over
for Japan as well as for the rest of the world. That Japanese enter-
prises would have to be put on a sounder footing to face the new era
was apparent to a broad spectrum of Japanese opinion."
Among the obvious solutions was the public offering of stock in
Japan and abroad at or near the market price. Other remedies recom-
mended included tax reform whereby dividends would be treated
wholly or partially as a business expense or the corporate tax rate
would be reduced with respect to earnings paid out as dividends."
Also suggested was greater taxation of interest payments in the hands
of recipients to bring it into line with that levied on dividends, thus
making stock more attractive relative to debt securities.1 Likewise
recommended was hastening the incorporation into capital of the
revaluation reserve through the issuance to stockholders of gratis
shares." There were even some advocates of reform of the stock
markets to give investors greater confidence."'
These problems will be left to others, while this article examines the
public offering mechanism in Japan and abroad as a remedy. Before
doing so it would be well to pause and examine the legal background.
Legal Background. Japanese corporations operate within the
framework of the Commercial Code which was originally based on
14 e among others, Matsui, supra note 6; and Oguma, supra note 12, representing
the views of officials of the Ministry of Finance; O.AMURA, Op. cit. sPra note 10,
passim representing the views of scholars; REPORT TO THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COUNCIL (June 22, 1960), op. cit. supra note 6, which
body is composed of 13 members with academic and business experience and which
had been reactivated in 1959 to study and report on the critical situation; See COHEN,
op. cit. supra note 3, passim for the view of a qualified foreign observer.
15 On April 1, 1962, the corporate tax rate was reduced from 38% to 28% on that
portion of earnings paid out as dividends thereby showing that recommendations some-
times are acted upon.
16 REPORT TO THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COUNCIL
(June 22, 1960), op. cit. supra note 6; Oguma, supra note 12.
17 Oguma, supra note 12; the Special Measures Law for Enterprise Capital Ful-
fillment Through Revaluation Reserve (Law No. 142 of 1954) already provided
incentive through imposing a limitation on the amount of dividends that could be paid
by companies with less than specified percentages of their revaluation reserves trans-
ferred to capital. Nonetheless, by the end of September, 1960 only 26% of the total
revaluation reserve had been transferred to capital (38% if electric utilities are ex-
cluded from the computation) leaving Y910 billion still outstanding, with revaluation
reserve still 42% of capital (24% if electric utilities are excluded).
Is See Matsui, supra note 6, who dwells on the fact that 70% of stock trades are
on a back to back or wash basis (baikai) within the securities houses rather than over
the exchanges and on the fact that the securities houses are often exposed to conflicts
of interest due to their manifold roles of dealer, broker, underwriter, investment fund
manager, not to mention trading on their own account.
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the German code. The Commercial Code went into effect in 1890,
but underwent substantial revision in 1899 and 1911 to bring it more
into line with Japanese conditions. 9 Thereafter the Code continued
largely without amendment for over a quarter of a century through
the tremendous economic expansion of the First World War and the
years immediately following and the vicissitudes of the post-1929 de-
pression years. To meet the needs of the times, however, a substantial
reform was promulgated in 1938,20 following on the heels of large-
scale revisions of the commercial laws of England, France, Germany,
Spain and Switzerland.
In addition to a number of changes of no interest to this article, the
1938 Amendment endeavored to promote freedom of investment by
providing for preferred stock,2' conversion between different types of
stock,22 (i.e., preferred into common and common into preferred) and
conversion of debentures into stock. 3 These amendments, however,
were severely circumscribed and therefore of little practical effect.
For example, although the preferred stock could be issued at any
time," conversion of stock and debentures took effect only at the close
of business in the year in which the demand for conversion was made. 5
It remained for the postwar Occupation reforms to make these pro-
visions more flexible and to introduce sweeping changes in other areas.
At the insistence of the Occupation authorities the Commercial Code
underwent two revisions, the first in 1948 which abolished the payment
of shares by installments, and the much broader reform of 1950.2
One aim of the 1950 Amendment, which is not the concern of this
article, was the introduction of corporate democracy. Another was
the provision of new methods of attracting and inducing capital in-
vestment. The latter generally met with the approval of Japanese
19 Shoh5 (Commercial Code) Law No. 32 of 1890, Law No. 48 of 1899 and Law
No. 73 of 1911, respectively.
20 Sh~hO-chfi Kaisei Horitsu ShikO Ho (Law Enforcing the Commercial Code
Amendment Law) Law No. 73 of 1938.
211938 COMMERCIAL CODE, arts. 168, 222.
22 Id., arts. 359-363.
23 Id., arts. 364-369.
24 Id., art. 168.
25 Id., arts. 362, 368.
2r Law No. 148 of 1948 and Law No. 167 of 1950, respectively, the second of which
entered into effect in 1951 after some further changes (Law No. 209 of 1951) ; for the
background and substance of these two amendments, see Blakemore and Yazawa,
Japanese Commercial Code Revisions Concerning Corporations, 12 Am. J. Coir'. L. 12(1953), SuzuKI AND ISHII, KAISEI KABUSHiKI KAISHAHO KAISErSU (Commentaries
on the Revised Corporation Law) 1-7 (1950); and OsUMI AND OMORI, CHIKUJO
KAISEt KAISHAHO KAISETSU (Article by Article Commentary on the Revised Cor-
poration Law) 1-4 (1951).
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business and legal circles, although there was some opposition to
specific provisions. 7 It was recognized as necessary to have a variety
of equity securities available to appeal to a broad range of investors
if the imbalance between debt and equity was to be corrected.28
The big change brought in by the 1950 Amendment, as far as
capital procurement is concerned, was the introduction of the system
of authorized capital, otherwise described by one Japanese scholar
as the "installment stock issuance system."" Formerly, new stock
could be issued only by amending the articles of incorporation to
provide the necessary stated capital for that issue, which required
stockholder action. Prior to 1948 this difficulty had been ameliorated
by the provision, abolished in that year, that only one-fourth of the
issued stock need be paid up at the time of issuance. The authorized
capital system was thus doubly welcome and was hailed as providing
greater flexibility in raising capital."
Regrettably the effect of this reform was offset by an unfortunate
provision relating to pre-emptive rights. The Occupation reformers,
concerned as they were with corporate democracy in the form of
stockholder safeguards, hesitated to follow the full implication of the
authorized capital system and give full authority to the directors to
issue stock at discretion. After much argument with the Japanese
members of the drafting committee who wished to provide for pre-
emptive rights only where the articles of incorporation specifically
so provided, the Occupation members, who favored the general recog-
nition of a pre-emptive right, compromised by inserting a provision to
the effect that a corporation must provide in its articles for the exist-
ence, restriction, or exclusion of pre-emptive rights.22 This provision
was roundly condemned as confusing and as exposing corporations
to nullification since the provision was a required provision and there-
fore if defective could result in the cancellation of the articles of
incorporation. 8
2
7 Id. at 22; but one Ministry of Justice official writing a decade after the event saw
the 1950 Amendment as a plan on the part of the Occupation authorities to open Japan
to foreign investment, particularly American, by making over the Commercial Code in
the American image, Yoshida, Shilion Torihiki no Jiyuka to Mugiketsuken Kabu,
(Non Voting Stock and the Liberalization of Capital Transactions), 169 CLJ 14,
(Mar. 15, 1960).
28 OyAMURA, op. cit. spra at 125; Suzua AND IsHr, op. ci. supra note 26, at 7-8.2 9 Id. 232.
30 Pre-1950 CoMMFRcIA. CODE, arts. 166, 342, 348.
31 Suzuxi AxD Isnir, op. cit. supra note 26, at 8; Osuza AND OMoR, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 8.
32 1950 CoMa~lnclAL CODE, arts. 166, 347.
33 See, among others, an article by a Ministry of Justice official, Kagawa, Shinkabu
1963]
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It remained for the Japanese themselves to compound the confusion
in the 1955 amendment to the Commercial Code" by abolishing the
1950 requirement but providing that while the directors have the
freedom to allocate stock in their discretion, only the stockholders
may grant pre-emptive rights to others." This provision will be the
object of more detailed discussion later in this article. Suffice it to
say at this point the freedom of the directors to allocate is also limited
by the requirement that paid up stock must always be at least one-
fourth of the authorized stock,"6 hardly an onerous burden in fact and
no doubt owing its origin to the pre-1948 provision that only one-fourth
of the issued stock need be paid in at the time of issue.
To give additional financing flexibility the 1950 Amendment also
introduced no par stock for the first time to the Japanese scene,"
going one step beyond American law by providing that authorized but
unissued stock may be either par or no par at the discretion of the
directors unless a limitation is provided in the articles. The board of
directors is also free to determine the consideration which a corpora-
tion will receive for the issuance of shares without par value and to
provide that up to one-fourth of the consideration paid for such shares
may be set aside as paid-in surplus.3
Finally, as further inducement to investors in corporations, the 1950
amendment provided for redeemable stock, 9 stock dividends," stock
splits,"' and transfers from reserves to stated capital.4
How these financial implements have been used will be the next
subject for review.
PRESENT JAPANESE PRACTICE
Rights Offerings versus Public Offerings of Stock. Rights offer-
ings to stockholders of new stock at par value regardless of the current
market price is an ingrained custom which persists to the present day
Hikiukeken ni Ka ,.uru Teikan Kitei Henko Rei ni tsuite no Gutaiteki Kensa (A
Practical Examination Concerning Articles of Incorporation Amendments Relating to
Pre-emptive Rights), 11 CLJ 2, (Jan. 15, 1956).
34 Law No. 28 of 1955.
35 COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 280-2 (hereafter whenever the COMMERCIAL CODE is
referred to without a date, the COMMERCIAL CODE in effect from the 1955 amendment
up to the amendment (Law No. 82 of 1962) taking effect on April 1, 1963, which
effected changes not germane to this article, is intended.)
36 COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 166, 347.
37 Id., arts. 166, 199.
38 Id., arts. 284-2, 280-2.
39 Id., art. 222.
40 Id., art. 293-2.
41 Id., art. 293-4.
42 Id., art. 293-3.
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in Japanese stock issues, regardless of the changes in the Commercial
Code, thereby frustrating the efforts of the Commercial Code re-
formers to achieve flexibility and mobility of corporate capital."
Public offerings of stock at or near market have grown in recent years,
but still represent a very small portion of new stock issued," despite
the fact that the number of companies taking this route since the pre-
emptive rights amendment to the Commercial Code in 1955 referred
to above is substantial. 5 The reason is that there are very few com-
panies which issue all, or even a sizeable part, of their new stock on
a public offering basis. Generally, a public offering of stock is ac-
companied by a substantial rights offering at par to the stockholders."
In fact the public offering is often nothing more than a method of
disposing of unsubscribed shares or fractional shares or of rounding
out the stated capital following a rights offering."
The public offering has occasioned much debate in Japan, and can
hardly be said to have received unqualified or widespread acceptance.
The arguments on both sides are many and varied. The arguments in
favor may be summarized as follows: (1) the premium received over
par value improves the capital structure by bringing additional funds
into the capital account as capital surplus; (2) since fewer shares are
issued in relation to the consideration received, the ensuing dividend
burden is less than when a rights offering at par is made; (3) price
fluctuations are minimized since speculative investment in anticipation
of a rights offering at par is eliminated; and (4) public offering at
market is in accord with the framework of the Commercial Code as
amended during the 1950's, since there is no requirement that the
new stock must be issued to particular persons.
The arguments opposed run as follows: (1) despite the present
framework of the Commercial Code, there is a strong custom in
Japan in favor of rights offerings at par and change to a public
offering system would undermine present stock prices which are
43 OKmu A, op. cit. supra note 28 at 242.
44 In 1961, 96.2% of the amount of capital increases was represented by rights offer-
ings to stockholders as opposed to a high of 99.9% in 1955, the year when the pre-
emptive rights provision of the COmmERCIAL CODE was relaxed, see Kabunushi Wariate
(Stockholder Rights Offering), 253 CLJ 4, (Aug. 5/15, 1962).
45In 1956, 38 companies issued on the basis of a public offering; in 1957, 45; in
1958, 33; in 1959, 62; in 1960, 131; and in 1961, 292. For the years, 1956 to 1958,
inclusive see YAmAicnr SECURITIES Co., LTD., Zosixi No JITSUmu (Practical Aspects
of Capital Increase), 277 (rev. ed. 1961) and for subsequent years; Yamaichi Securities
Research Dept., Kobo (Public Offering), 253 CLJ 8, (Aug. 5/15, 1962).
46 See tables in YAMAicHr, op. cit. supra note 45, 278-281, and in Yanaichi, Kobo,
supra note 45, 10-12, and accompanying text.
47 Ibid.
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based on anticipation of rights offerings, thereby injuring present
shareholders who bought on that basis; (2) rights offerings are a
strong inducement to stock purchases, so that departing from this
system would discourage the much needed equity investment, thereby
more than offsetting any advantage to the issuing companies from the
premium price (price over par) received; (3) it is difficult to fix the
public offering price since the market price changes so often and
quickly, and there are few other objective standards, thereby opening
up the possibility of abuse; (4) public offering with its greater con-
sideration for the issue of fewer shares will check the desired dividend
rate drop, thereby continuing the high dividend level; (5) it is neces-
sary first to dispose of the large revaluation reserve 9 through free
distribution of shares to obtain a proper stock price level before re-
sorting to public offerings.49
The middle view is that there is no clear cut answer."0 The argu-
ments for public offerings are logical whereas the arguments in opposi-
tion are to a great extent traditional and emotional, but then some-
times it is illogical to be logical in the face of conditions as they are.
It is not proper to cite the example of the United States where public
offerings are common since conditions are different from those in
Japan. In the United States there are frequent stock splits to appeal to
investors and to reward stockholders whereas these, though permitted
by the Commercial Code, are largely unknown because of the prev-
alence of par value stock with a par value at the minimum permitted
by law."' There is no clearly defined stockholder expectation with
respect to rights offerings. Stockholders hold or sell, and investors
buy, stock from a variety of motives, so that it is unwise to be dog-
matic on this score. In short, one must be pragmatic. Each company
must examine its own situation and decide for itself whether and to
48 See note 17, supra.
49 Niwayama, Kabushiki no Kobo ni tsuite (Concerning Public Offering of Stock),
152 CLJ 2, (Sept. 15, 1959).
50 Ibid., where the middle position is espoused by a Ministry of Finance official with
the arguments given in the balance of the paragraph.
51 Up to 1948 the minimum par value per share was Y20 if the share was fully paid
in at the time of issue and Y50 if it was not; thereafter to 1950, the minimum par was
Y50 and from 1951, Y500, see COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 202, which is and has been the
provision specifying the minimum. The controlling minimum is the one in effect at the
time of incorporation. According to a Ministry of Finance survey as reported in
YAMAICHI, op. cit. supra note 45, at 85, as of March 31, 1958, of 2,709 listed and
unlisted companies, 70% (1,990) had Y50 par; 22% (591) had ¥500 par; and of the
balance there were 13 with Y20, 1 with Y25, 22 with Y1,000 and 28 with Y4,000 or
Y5,000. Of the 1,194 companies listed at the end of 1962, 1,138 had stock with a par
value of Y50. Understanding Japanese Stocks-Par Value, Dividend and Capital Boosts
Peculiar to Japan Defined. The Japan Stock Review, No. 54, 15 (Jan. 28, 1963).
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what extent a public offering is feasible. The big problem in a public
offering is to avoid offering the issue to a favored few or on un-
reasonable terms. If this is done, public offerings can hardly be said
to be a trick of management to take advantage of the stockholders.
After all, management and stock holders do have common interests.
Some of the foregoing arguments merit further consideration. The
forces in favor of public offerings received a powerful boost from
President, now Chairman, Sato of the Mitsui Bank, who came out
unqualifiedly in favor. 2 He pointed out that market price offerings
were essential to replenish the equity funds of corporations. A market
price issue enables the company to take advantage of its true worth
and at the same time improve its capital structure. Furthermore, by
bringing in more funds it avoids the tendency to dividend reduction
inherent in rights offerings which in turn causes management to eschew
capital increases and resort to bank loans. He demolished the position
of those who said resort to market price offerings would cause turmoil
in the stock market by pointing out that rights offerings at par do
that very thing, since a one-for-one stock issue at par of a stock with
a Y50 par and a cum-rights market price of Y250 results in an ex-
rights market price of Y150 with the Y100 profit on the new shares
wiped out by the Y100 drop in the market value of the old shares.
By way of contrast, if the company's asset position is improved in
relation to the stock issued and there is no dividend cut, as is usually
the case with a public offering at market, the stockholders' position
is not adversely affected.
Despite the logic of Chairman Sato's position, many, including
those in the securities trade, firmly believe that anticipation of rights
offerings are an important element in maintaining stock prices.58 The
facts tell otherwise since every rights offering is accompanied by a
price drop to reflect the dilution, which drop may in fact be accen-
tuated by speculators leaving the security to seek another one ripe for
a rights offering.
It is interesting to note that the advocates of the market disruption
theory were most vocal during the big rise in the Tokyo stock market
from 1958 to July, 1961. During the drop in 1961 which carried
over into 1962 and the concurrent tight money policy, the fact that
a company was contemplating a rights offering was often a depressing
52 Kabuahki no Jika Hakko o Teisho suru, (I Advocate Market Price Issuance of
Stock), 126 CLJ 2, (Jan. 25, 1959).5s YAmAi C, op. cit. supra note 45, at 64.
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factor since stockholders were hard pressed to raise the funds to
subscribe, having to sell part of their holdings to obtain funds to pro-
tect their equity position in the remainder from dilution. 4 Rights
offerings might continue to be an attraction in the companies with
smaller capitalization but as they grow larger the attraction will de-
crease and in the meantime the stock split effect of the rights offering
serves to keep the market price of the stock dangerously low in relation
to par thereby inhibiting future financial flexibility. 5
On the whole, stock prices would seem to be formed by a number
of factors other than, or certainly in addition to, rights offerings.
Interest rates in comparison to dividends is certainly one factor, and
growth prospects another,55 although it must be admitted that United
States yardsticks such as the price-earnings ratio are largely ignored
in Japan."
The advocates of rights offerings to reduce the high dividend rate
seem to stand on equally unfirm ground. High dividend rates are
cited, but they are inevitably given in terms of par value, not market
price. To the investor, and indeed also to the stockholder who might
be able to buy new stock at par but then only to see his old stock
sink proportionately in value, the important thing is the relation of
the dividend to the market price, that is the yield, which is quite a
different thing from the dividend ratio, that is the dividend in relation
to par. Furthermore, both the dividend ratio and stock yield have
shown a great drop in recent years due to the increase in the number
of shares outstanding which has kept ahead of industrial growth, great
as that has been."
5 This is particularly true of the so-called "mammoth industrials" such as Hitachi,
Toshiba, the steel companies, etc., whose capital was so large that any rights offering
called for large sums to be invested. The problem was heightened by the economic
recession then in progress which made it likely that the dilution would be accompanied
by a dividend cut, as indeed it was among many of the "mammoths." The situation
was so critical that the Ministry of Finance had to persuade many of the larger com-
panies to postpone their rights offerings by several months into the spring of 1962.
55 The COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 202, prohibits the issuance of par value stock at less
than par with the result that when such once proud growth issues as the steels come
upon hard times, as in the recent recession, their stock price, already depressed by
numerous rights offerings sink below par, thereby preventing future issues.
56 Kisamori, Kabuka o Kosei suru Mono (Factors Forming Stock Prices), 117
CLJ 5, (Oct. 25, 1958).
57 Nagada, Saikin ni Okeru Kigyo no Haito Seisaku (Recent Corporate Dividend
Policy), 148 CLJ 21, (Aug. 20, 1959). There are signs of change, see Trading an
Market Shifting From Capital Gain to Rate of Yield, 54 Japan Stock Review, 15
(Jan. 28, 1963).
58 Nagada, supra note 57, at 21, where it appears that in 1958 the average dividend
ratio for all listed companies was 13.5% compared with a yield of only 4.6%.
59 Id., where it is shown that the average dividend ratio and yield on all listed
companies five years before, in 1953, were 21% and 7.8%, respectively, while dividends
paid out had increased from Y52 billion to Y121 billion.
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If it is necessary to reduce per share dividends even further, that
objective can be achieved simultaneously with public offerings, not
prior thereto. There are complaints that the large revaluation reserve
is not being incorporated into capital fast enough-through the issuance
of gratis shares."0 Certainly its incorporation would have a dramatic
effect on per share dividends," but too rapid a drop would be harmful,
particularly in the present condition of the market: A better policy
would seem to be to couple the disposition of the revaluation reserve
with increased public offerings. The public offerings would provide
additional assets over the par value to cushion the effect of the neces-
sary outpouring of gratis stock. This would kill two, or better, three
birds with one stone by hastening the disposal of the. legacy of the
inflation-racked years, improving the equity ratio and reducing divi-
dends gradually, if at all.
Fixing the price of stock publicly offered has been made to seem
very complicated by the numerous commentators on the subject. It
need not be as bad as it seems; this subject will be examined in the
description of the public offering as carried out in Japan.
In concluding this section, it might be well once more to cite the
June, 1960 report of the Securities Exchange Council. The Council
took a middle position on the subject of public offerings.82 It stated
that new stock issues entirely on a public offering basis were inap-
propriate in view of the strength of the rights offering custom. It
advocated that partial public offerings be -used in accord with condi-
tions in each industry and company and to the extent they, do. not
disrupt the stock market, in order to assist in achieving the.goal of
replenishing equity capital. It pointed out that management should
pursue public offerings, if at all, as a consistent policy and not on an
opportunistic basis only when stock prices are high.18
The report concluded with the admonition that public offerings
should be accompanied by sweeteners to assuage the disappointment
of the stockholders. Among the inducements to be offered to avoid
stockholder protest would be gratis offerings of shares from capital
surplus or the revaluation reserve, a concurrent rights offering and, of
all things, a dividend increase. The free distribution of shares from
60 Oguma, supra note 12.
61 See Oguma, supra note 12, where figures are given to show the effect.
62 181 CLJ 2, (July 1, 1960).
63 This seems highly unrealistic since public offerings inevitably will increase when
prices are high, as indeed they should since that is the most advantageous time, from
the point of view of the company and its stockholders, to-issue stock. •
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the capital surplus would be "splitting the melon" of the public offer-
ing premium among the stockholders. The Report avoided specifics,
but a year earlier the Tokyo Securities Dealers' Association had urged
that no more than 10% of any single capital increase be accomplished
by means of a public offering. 4
Public Offerings in Japan. The public offering in Japan, or
Kobo, has been defined"5 as the method of soliciting subscriptions
for stock directly or indirectly from among many unspecified persons
without granting pre-emptive rights. The word "indirectly" is used
purposely in the definition to include the situation where underwriters
subscribe to the stock from the issuing company and then resell to
the public.
Issuing companies generally have their public offerings underwritten
by the securities houses. The securities houses in an underwriting"
act as subscribers to the stock within the meaning of the Commercial
Code, thereby becoming stockholders following which they resell to
the investing public. The underwriters are entered on the register of
stockholders as stockholders. The fact that a contract is signed with
specific underwriters and that they do become the initial stockholders
to the exclusion of everyone else raises a question as to whether they
have been granted pre-emptive rights within the meaning of article
280-2 of the Commercial Code thereby requiring stockholder authori-
zation, but this thorny subject is reserved for discussion later." Suffice
it to say here that stockholder authorization has not been obtained
for a public offering by underwriting in Japan.
64 Yamaichi, Kobo, supra note 45.
65 Goto, Kobo o Meguru Sho Mondai (Some Problems Involving Public Offerings),
26 CLJ 6, (June 5, 1956), and repeated by the Yamaichi Securities Research Dept.,
of which Mr. Goto was the head, in YAM~ACHI, op. cit. supra note 45, at 274.
66 It is estimated that 99% of public offerings in Japan are underwritten, Yamazaki,
Kobo Kagaku no Kettei Hoho ni tsuite (Concerning the Method of Determining the
Public Offering Price), 215 CLJ 2 (June 25, 1961).
67 As used in this article "underwriting" means underwriting by purchase (kaitori
hikiuke) of the entire public offering.
68 Naturally this is true only in the case of those companies which took advantage
of the 1955 amendment to the COMMERCIAL CODE to remove from their articles of
incorporation any restriction on the issuance of shares to other than stockholders. That
such removal is now well nigh universal among companies likely to issue stock publicly
can be inferred from the fact that as of September 30, 1955, three months after the
amendment went into effect, 31% of all listed companies had amended their articles
to delete the previously required reference to pre-emptive rights, while "the overwhelm-
ing majority" of the remaining listed "were ready to do so," Kagawa, Shinkabu
Hikiukeken ni Kansuru Teikan Kitei Henko Rei ni tsuite no Gutaiteki Kensa (A
Concrete Investigation Concerning Examples of Amendment of the Provisions of
Articles Relating to Pre-emptive Rights to New Stock), 11 CLJ 2, (Jan. 15, 1956).
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The first step in a public offering is a board of directors meeting to
authorize the issue as required by article 280-2, para. 1, of the
Commercial Code. Paragraph 1 of that article requires director action
on only three points, namely (1) whether or not the new shares are
those having par value, (2) the class (i.e., whether common or pre-
ferred), the number, the issue price, the payment date and, (3) in
the case of no par stock, the amount not credited to the stated capital
out of the issue price. Of them all, only the determination of the issue
price presents any serious problem.
The object of a public offering in Japan, as elsewhere, is to obtain
as much money as possible from the investing public by setting the
price as close to market as conditions will permit. This desire for
economic benefit is reinforced by the fear of legal sanction contained
in articles 280-10, 280-11 and 280-15 of the Commercial Code.
Article 280-10 provides that "if the company issues shares . . . at
a grossly unfair price and there is any fear of shareholders suffering
pecuniary disadvantage thereby, such shareholders may demand of
the company for the suspension of such issuance." Article 280-11 puts
added fangs in article 280-10 by providing for the payment to the
company of the difference between a fair issue price and the unfair
issue price by any person who in collusion with any director has sub-
scribed for shares at a grossly unfair price. Article 280-15 is to the
effect that a director or stockholder may bring an action for nullifi-
cation of the issuance of new shares within six months of their date
of issuance. Despite its ferocity, or perhaps because of it, article
280-15 is the least worrisome of the three. It does not spell out what
constitutes grounds for nullification and furthermore runs counter to
the cherished principle in Japanese jurisprudence of "safety of transac-
tions" which among other things holds that it is not proper to undo
an issue of stock already in the hands of the public particularly where
injunctive relief and monetary recompense are available under articles
280-10 and 280-11.69
In view of the strictures of article 280-10 the question arises as to
what constitutes a fair price. The Code says nothing. Two questions
arise in this connection. The first is the amount and the standard by
which it is determined and the second is the time as of which the fair-
ness is evaluated. Views on the subject are legion, but the courts have
60 YAMAICHI, op. cit. supra note 45, at 339; and Yoshida, Kaitori Hikiuke to Shoho
Dai 280 no 2 2-Ko (Article 280-2 Paragraph 2 of the Commeridal Code and Under-
writing by Purchase), 268 CLJ 2, (Jan. 25, 1963).
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spoken only once, in 1953 in the Matsuya case,7" and since then have
lapsed into a tantalizing silence.
According to the Matsuya decision the fairness of the price must
be determined as of the date the price is determined by the directors,
not the payment date to the company by the underwriters nor the date
the public purchases from the underwriters. To have decided other-
wise would only have compounded the difficulties of the underwriters
and the company without benefiting the stockholders. The directors
and underwriters can hardly be expected to take the blame merely
because the market price and other factors happen to undergo a radical
change between the date the offering price is fixed and the shares paid
for. Being human, and in order to do the best job possible, they will
endeavor to shorten as much as possible the interval between price
determination and payment. This interval has been shortened con-
siderably but not to the extent found in the United States where every-
thing seems to happen with split second speed in underwritten public
offerings.
To shorten this interval the directors at the meeting referred to
above often postpone the determination of the price to a later date.
Following the initial board meeting, a "notification," or registration
statement is filed with the Ministry of Finance pursuant to article 5
of the Securities and Exchange Law."' The notification does not be-
come effective for 30 days but the device of filing a draft notification
is available to start the running of the 30-day period. Then after
about 25 or 27 days the formal notification is filed with the price fixed
and stated therein. The filing of the formal notification is preceded
by the signing of the underwriting agreement which is an exhibit
thereto.
It is the general rule that the underwriters will sell to the public
at the same price as their subscription price to the company, receiving
a commission or fee as compensation. The underwriters subscribe on
the subscription date set by the company and complete the sale to
the public by the subscription payment date, which is the date they
must make payment to the bank or banks acting as subscription agents
for the new shares." The payment date in turn is the date when the
70 Tokyo District Court, 1953, "Yo" No. 127, Feb. 23, 1953. The text of the decision
is given in YAMAICHI, op. cit. supra note 45, at 289-293.
,1 Shoken Torihiki H8 (Securities Exchange Law) Law No. 25 of 1948. This Law
represents a combination of the United States Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and was introduced into Japan by the Occupation for much the
same motives as led to the adoption of its counter-parts in the United States.
72 Required by the COMMERCIAL CODE, arts. 175, 280-14.
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subscription agent bank pays the proceeds over to the company on
behalf of the subscribers.
Generally in a large issue the price must be fixed about 15 days
prior to the subscription payment date to allow three days for the
formal notification to become effective, two days for the approval of
the Tokyo Securities Dealers' Association"8 and ten days for the sale
to the public.7' In the case of a small issue the sale may only take two
or three days with the period between the determination of the price
and the subscription payment date shortened accordingly.7" The total
period from the initial directors' meeting to issuance is only 40 to 50
days, although it will be longer if it is coupled with a rights allocation
to stockholders, because of the more rigid procedures required."
Price is fixed on the basis of market at the time. The average dis-
count in Japan is 10% but there have been exceptions ranging up to
20%, none of which have invited attack under article 280-10 as
grossly unfair, much less nullification under article 280-15.11 The
Matsuya case represented an extreme situation where the market price
jumped from Y260 on the date when the price was fixed at Y250 to
Y650 on the payment date. Under the circumstances the problem of
determining the issue price would appear to be greatly exaggerated.
Nonetheless worry persists, with one suggestion having been made that
public offerings should be conducted on the basis of competitive bid-
ding to assure fairness in the issue price through the zest that comes
from the competition of an auction."
The commission rate in Japan is not excessive, being only 2%o to
3% on the average' compared with 8.5% in the United States. 0 It
is customary for many underwriters to participate directly or in-
directly. The original underwriters (moto-hikiukenin) are the larger
73 This approval takes the form of allocating roles as subunderwriters to the smaller
members of the Association, thereby assuring an equitable distribution of publicly
offered securities by the "Big Four" securities houses among their lesser brethren, see
YAMAICHr, op. cit. upra note 45, at 307.
74 Yamazaki, supra note 66.
7 Ibid.78 YAuAicEI, op. cit. supra note 45, at 294.
7 YAMAICHI, op. cit. supra note 45, at 288; and Yamaichi, op. cit. supra note 45.
78 Mizuta, Kobo Hoho no Kaizen ni Kansuru Ichi Teian (A Proposal Concerning
Reform of Public Offering Methods), 195 CLJ 2, (Nov. 15, 1960). The author is an
official of the Ministry of justice. He points out that this unique method of selling
stock was commonly used in Japan from 1912 to 1920 and that it seems to be in accord
with CO MaraCIAL CODE, art. 175, Paragraph 3, item 3 & COMMERCaL. CODE, art. 280-14,
which imply that the subscriber names the price he will pay, the issue price determined
by the company being nothing more than a minimum.79 YAmAici, op. cit. supra note 45, at 300-01.
s GUTHmAN & DOUGALL, CORPORATE FI~rANCI PoLicy, 362 (4th ed., 1962).
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houses with the other acting as sub-underwriters (shita-hikiukenin).
The company contracts with the original underwriters, who in turn
contract with the sub-underwriters.
As noted earlier public offerings in Japan are not large in size,
either in absolute terms or in comparison with the total of new stock
issues. What they lack in size, however, they make up in variety.
Japanese companies have been somewhat fearful about approaching
the public offering device in a straight forward manner. Instead they
have crept up on it in a variety of ways.
As has been indicated earlier, the public offering rarely occurs alone.
It is usually accompanied by something for the stockholders in the
way of a rights offering at par. In addition, the so-called public offering
may be entirely to the stockholders themselves, but with the price
fixed near the market. This was the pattern followed by Nissan Motor
and Hitachi in 1960, where 15% and 10% of the stock, respectively,
were issued to stockholders at 20% and 12% below the market,
respectively.8
The second pattern is the mixed offering whereby a part of the so-
called "publicly offered" shares are offered to stockholders on a pref-
erence basis with the balance being offered to the general public.
Typical of this type was the Toshiba offering in early 1961 where 8%
of the new issue was "offered publicly" with 70% of such 8% going
to the stockholders and the remaining 30% to the public. The price
in both cases was about 10% below the market.
The third pattern is the offering to customers which was typified by
the Toyo Kogyo offering in the spring of 1961. In this case 9% of
the issue was so offered with the rest going by way of a rights offering
to stockholders. The price to the customers was about 8% below the
market. Needless to say this type of offering has complications and
comes dangerously close to a pre-emptive right to third parties since
the selected subscribers are neither stockholders on the one hand nor
the general public on the other.
Yawata and Toyo Rayon, both coming out in early 1961, represent
the true public offering with all the publicly offered stock, 5% of the
issue on the first case and 10% in the second, going to the general
public at a discount of slightly over 10%. Finally there is the pattern
followed by Sony Corporation at about the same time whereby in addi-
tion to the usual rights offering, the public offering was accompanied
81 Both had the unique feature whereby the small stockholders' right to subscribe
was determined by lot to avoid the issue of new shares in other than round numbers.
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by a free distribution of shares to stockholders at the rate of one for
each ten held. The free distribution represented the transfer, at par
value, of capital surplus to capital thereby passing on to the stock-
holders part of the premium, i.e., that portion of the public issue price
over par, which appears as capital surplus. 2 Sony thus followed the
advice of the Securities Exchange Council by offering a sweetener for
the stockholders.
There are variations of the foregoing patterns. In fact the ingenuity
of corporate financial officers and their advisers seems unbounded, but
one thing all the offerings have in common is that they are under-
written."
Equity Securities Other Than Par Value Common Stock. We
have seen how the amendments to the Commercial Code over the last
quarter century have made available a number of different instruments
for equity finance. It remains to examine the use to which these instru-
ments have been put.
Preferred Stock. The oldest Japanese non-common stock equity
instrument is preferred stock, which was permitted by the pre-1938
Commercial Code, although the 1938 Amendment added the concept
of stock convertible into other classes of stock, thereby enabling pre-
ferred holders to switch into common if the terms of the issue so
provided. The history of preferred stock has not been a happy one.
It is neither fish nor fowl, offering neither the security of a debt
instrument nor the chance for gain of common stock. The first issue
of preferred stock was in 1887 by a company hard-pressed financially.
This inauspicious beginning preferred stock has never been able to
live down in the eyes of Japanese investors."' There were a few issues
in the years before the war but usually under adverse circumstances
such as inability to sell common, mergers or capital readjustments
under adverse circumstances, and the like. 5
Issues of preferred are even rarer today in contrast with the United
8 2 The free distribution was made pursuant to art. 293-3 of the CommacrA. CoDE.
The entry of premium in capital surplus is required by article 284-2.
83 The patterns of offerings are described in detail with full discussion of their
merits and demerits by the members of the Corporation Law Research Group in Kobo
no Shin Keitai oyobi "Kaitori Hikiuke" Keiyaku Wi tsuite (Concerning "Underwriting
by Purchase" Contracts and New Forms of Public Offerings), 218 CLJ 4, (July 25,
1961), an article, and in Kabushiki Kobo no Mondaiten (Public Stock Offering
Problems), 233 Juristo 6, (Sept. 1, 1961), a verbatim transcript of a roundtable
discussion. The Group includes, among others, Professors Suzuki and Yazawa of
Tokyo University, and officers of securities houses and corporations.
84 OKAMURA, op. cit. sipra note 28, at 123.
85 Ibid.
19631
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
States where, at the end of February, 1954, there were 465 issues listed
on exchanges with an aggregate market value of $8 billion.86 Nor is
there much likelihood of an increase in popularity in the near future
despite the plea of an eminent authority on corporation finance for
greater use to tap a new segment of investors." The fact is that
dividend rates on common stock are high in Japan and paid where-
ever possible in good times and bad at a uniform rate. Therefore the
common already has one of the characteristics usually associated with
preferred." As to the preference on liquidation, to a generation nur-
tured on rising stock prices and rapid business expansion it has lost
whatever meaning it may have had.
The fact that under the Commercial Code preferred may be made
convertible into common, and vice versa for that matter, 9 has done
nothing to invest it with popularity. In fact there has never been an
issue of convertible preferred, at least by a listed company, thereby
proving, if proof is needed, that it will take more than the conversion
feature to make preferred stock popular with Japanese investors."
Preferred stock may also be issued without the right to vote or with
the right to vote only when dividends are in arrears, but this hardly
adds lustre to an otherwise tarnished security.
No Par Stock. No par common stock enjoys no more popularity
than preferred stock. To date there have only been two issues9 with
a third one, by a major Japanese company, called off last summer with
the announcement that "further study was necessary."92 There are
S6 Id., citing Monthly Statistics of the New York Stock Exchange, for the figures.
87 Ibid.
88 This at least is the opinion of the Securities Exchange Council, which came to
the conclusion that it could not recommend the use of preferred stock in Japan, except
possibly for issues aimed at foreign investors. See its report of June 22, 1960 to the
Ministry of Finance, op. cit. supra note 6.
89 COMMERCIAL CODE, arts. 222-2 to 222-7 as inserted by the 1938 amendment. Until
the 1950 amendment conversion could take effect only at the end of the year in which
requested. Since the 1950 amendment conversion takes place when the demand therefor
is made, but this removal of an understandably inhibiting restriction has had no effect.
90 OKAMURA, op. cit. supra note 28, at 98.
91 By Mitsubishi Warehouse, whose President is reported to be an ex-professor of
law and hence interested in novel legal experiments, and Fuji Kanko. Mitsubishi
Warehouse issued no par in 1952 to its stockholders as a free distribution upon the
occasion of incorporating some of its revaluation reserve into stated capital, while Fuji
Kanko issued it on four occasions between 1952 and 1957 to obtain equipment funds,
OKAMURA, op. cit. supra note 28, at 172; 253 CLJ 24, (Aug. 5/15, 1962). Both com-
panies issued the no par in addition to already outstanding par stock.
92 Sumitomo Metals. See 248 CLJ 30, (June 15, 1962) and Tsugi no Shoho Kaisei
Jiko no Kaimei-Mondai no Haikei to Kaisei no Hoko-Mugakunen Kabushiki to
Gakumen Kabushiki to no Sogo no Tenkan (An Analysis of Subjects for the Next
Commercial Code Amendment-The Background of the Problem and the Tendency to
Amendment-Reciprocal Convertibility Between Par and No Par Stock), 258 CLJ 3,
5, (Oct. 5, 1962). It was reported that considerable pressure was put on the company
by the securities houses and the government to call off the issue because of the con-
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certainly a number of problems to be resolved before no par stock
can be expected to obtain wide spread acceptance in Japan. It is
looked upon in some circles as a strange species, too hastily trans-
planted to Japanese shores by the Occupation in the 1950 amendment
without discussion in Japan and with many problems unsolved." These
problems have received a complete airing in recent months9" and may
be the subject of an amendment to the Commercial Code in the not
too distant future,"5 after which no par stock may attain greater
acceptance.
The necessity for no par has been urged as a device to aid com-
panies whose stock is selling at or below par to obtain equity funds,"9
but this could be very unpopular with the par stockholders who would
see others obtaining an equity position at a price lower than they could
hope to do. They would be particularly annoyed if the company issued
no par rather than incorporating a free distribution in a rights offering
to them thereby enabling them to subscribe at less than par."
At any rate to urge no par as a device to bail out companies whose
stock has committed the sin of failing below par is hardly to enhance
its popularity. Its appearance would be looked upon as a confession
that all was not well with the issuer and that hence it, and, for that
matter, other issues of no par as well, should be avoided. " We have
already seen in the case of preferred stock how a security can become
a pariah by being identified with weakness. Even without this stigma,
popularity of no par stock may be a long way off in a country ac-
customed, as is Japan, to having its dividends expressed as a percentage
fusion that might arise on the stock market if a major company issued no par stock in
addition to its already outstanding par stock, at least until certain problems with
respect to no par stock are resolved; see note 94 infra.
93 See the conclusion of the Securities Exchange Council in its deliberations leading
up to the Report of June 22, 1960 to the Ministry of Finance as reported in 151 CLJ 15,
(Sept. 5, 1959).
94 The principal problem is whether no par may be exchanged for par and vice
versa. This is a real problem since the COMMERCIAL CODE (arts. 166, 199) goes one
step beyond American law and provides that a company may have both outstanding at
the same time. A resume of the problems was recently given by a Ministry of Justice
official, Yoshida, Mugakumen Kabushiki o Meguru Sho Mondai (Some Problems
Surrounding No Par Stock), 247 CLJ 2, (June 5, 1962). He concludes that they are
not mutually convertible under the present CODE, that no par and par stock certificates
cannot be consolidated and that probably a no par preferred could not be issued because
in a preferred stock it is customary to express dividends as a percentage of par (al-
though he admits they could be expressed as a yen amount).
95 See Reciprocal Convertibility Between Par and No Par Stock, supra note 92.
06Id.; also O1AMUTRA, op. cit. supra note 28, at 152, 153.
97 By this method the free distribution is made together with the rights offering at
a ratio of, say, one to five so that in effect a share with Y50 par can be obtained for a
subscription price of 40, the difference being accounted for by a transfer of T10 per
share to stated capital from the revaluation reserve.
98 OKAmuRA, op. cit. supra note 28, at 154.
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of par and paid on a uniform basis wherever possible.99 With no par
the old guidelines and landmarks would be gone. Under the circum-
stances it will be a long time before no par takes hold in Japan.'
Convertible Debentures. Convertible debentures have hardly fared
better in Japan. Introduced by the 1938 amendment they arrived on
the scene just in time for the war, with the result that none were
issued until 1949, and apparently only then because, in the postwar
inflation, ordinary debentures were unsalable.' Perforce, the first
companies to issue convertibles were weak companies, at least at the
time of issue, so that once more we find a security condemned by the
average Japanese investor at least in part because of association with
weakness. °2
There are other reasons also. Until 1950, as in the case of con-
vertible preferred, conversion took place only at the end of the year in
which the demand was made. This was corrected in the 1950 amend-
ment which unfortunately, as we have seen above, added the require-
ment to the Commercial Code that the articles of all companies must
contain a statement as to pre-emptive rights. Provision for some degree
of pre-emptive rights was common. Since it was generally held that an
issue of convertible debentures impinged upon the preemptive rights
of stockholders, it was necessary from 1950 to 1955 when the pro-
vision was removed, to confine issues of convertibles entirely to the
stockholders.' Even with the necessity removed, the custom of is-
suing only to stockholders continued and still prevails today.
One reason for issuance of convertible debentures exclusively to
stockholders is that their characteristics are hardly of the kind to
appeal to any one else. They have been described as "too simple and
disjointed ,' and with good reason. There is no anti-dilution formula,
a fatal weakness in a country where rights offerings at par value are
endemic.' They are convertible during only a part of their life, and
99 Yoshida, supra note 94, Some Problems Surrounding No Par Stock, admits this
is a serious psychological problem and might require considerable adjustment.
100 The security houses, the stock market and the government, whose pressure can
be overwhelming, see note 92 supra, are taking a cautious attitude.
101 OKAMURA, op. cit. supra note 28, at 359. For a list and description of the 15
domestic issues (by 14 companies) to date see 253 CLJ 28, 29, (Aug. 5/15, 1962).
102 Ibid.
103 SUZUKI AND ISHII, op. cit. supra note 26, at 304; Osumi AND OMORI, op. cit.
supra note 26 at 494, 495; and Ohtori, Tokushu na Shasai-Rieki Sanka Shasai o
Chu.shin ni (Special Debentures-Centering on Participating Debentures), 189 CLJ 2
(Sept. 15, 1960) and 191 CLJ 14 (Sept. 25, 1960), Parts I and II, respectively.
04 OKAMURA, op. cit. supra note 28, at 358.
105 Generally it is understood that there will be no rights offering during the life
of the debentures, although there have been at least four cases out of the 15 issues to
date where there were such rights offerings, see 101 CLJ 16, (June 1, 1958). Such an
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their life is short, generally only three years, although there is one
issue with a maturity of seven.'08 Furthermore, during much of the
period in which they are ostensibly convertible, they lose this char-
acteristic by reason of the provision of the Commercial Code' to the
effect that a demand for conversion cannot be made during the period
the issuer's stock register is closed, which can be four or more months
a year.'0
There are some advantages, however. All but two of the 15 issues
are secured,'0 0 which is unusual for a convertible. But more impor-
tantly all are convertible on a par basis, that is the face amount of
the debenture is convertible into stock with the same aggregate par
value, regardless of the market price of the common stock at the time
of issue."0 Issuance on such advantageous terms means that only
stockholders can legally subscribe."' And in fact it probably means
that that is the only basis on which anyone could be induced to sub-
scribe to them."2
Convertible debentures may become popular on the domestic scene,
but only if the issue of convertibles by Japanese companies in the
United States captures the imagination of the Japanese investor and
if the domestic issues adopt most of the features of such issues. The
Securities Exchange Council found itself unable to recommend con-
vertibles to the Ministry of Finance except for foreign issues and then
not with the characteristics of the local issues."3
Other types of semi-equity debentures are theoretically possible
under the Commercial Code such as participating debentures, income
debentures and profit-sharing debentures,"14 although one type very
"understanding" has some meaning when all the holders are stockholders, but would be
of little value to third party holders.10 OKAmuRA, op. cit. supra note 28, at 358.
107 Articles 341-5 and 222-5. More will be said on this subject in the discussion of
Japanese convertible issues in the United States.108 Two months for each of the semi-annual ordinary meetings of stockholders and
in addition one or two months each for any extraordinary meeting, rights offering, etc.
Japanese companies have the option of adopting a record date system, CommEICIAL
CODE art. 224-2, but few have done so.
309 253 CLJ 28, 29, supra note 101.
110 Ibid.
"'1 See the discussion hereafter in connection with Japanese issues in the United
States.
112 OKAjUrA, op. cit. supra note 28, at 359, 360, states par conversion originated
because the terms had to be that favorable if the security was to be sold. He believes,
however, this is not necessary today, although it is still being done.
"13 See the Report in 181 CLJ 2, supra note 6. The feature that most repelled the
Council was par conversion.
14 Ohtori, Special Debentures-Centering on Participating Debentures, op. cit.
supra note 103; Professor Ohtori, then of Hokkaido University, now of Tokyo Uni-
versity, is an authority on Japanese bonds and debentures.
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popular in the United States, namely debentures with stock warrants
attached, is not possible."' Here too the auspicies are poor, however.
One company endeavored to issue participating debentures, but had
to abandon the attempt under pressure."6
The only conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is that while
the Commercial Code provides for several types of equity and semi-
equity securities, and tacitly permits others, custom and conditions
have not yet allowed Japanese companies to take advantage of the
financing flexibility the reformers of the last quarter century have so
thoughtfully provided. Further changes in the Code are no doubt
needed, particularly with respect to no-par stock, but whether they
would be any more effective in inducing an abandonment of custom
than their predecessors is to be doubted.
ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES
The Foreign Investment Background. Foreign investment in Jap-
anese securities did not wait for Japanese companies to issue securities
in the United States or elsewhere abroad. If in the 1950's Japan was
not prepared to go to the foreign investor, the foreign investor was
most ready and willing to come to Japan. The door was opened with
the passage of the Law Concerning Foreign Investment..7 in 1950
which in effect gave foreign investors in Japanese securities certain
115 Id., because the warrants would be granting pre-emptive rights to third parties
thus requiring stockholder approval under article 280-2 of the COMMERCIAL CODE. This
approval lapses after six months by the specific provision of paragraph 4 thereof.
Convertible debentures are unaffected by this provision as, unlike the other types of
semi-equity debentures referred to above, they are specifically authorized by the
COMMERCIAL CODE, arts. 341-2 to 341-5, with independent stockholder approval required
by art. 341-2. No treasury stock is available for issue against the warrants since the
COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 210 prohibits a company, with a few minor exceptions, from
owning its own stock. For the background of and reasons for this prohibition, see
Ueda, Jiko Kabushiki no Shutoku ni tsuite (Concerning Acquisition of Treasury
Stock), 111 CLJ 2, (Aug. 25, 1958).
116 The company was Kanto Electric which obtained the blessing of Professor
Ohtori (in his two part article referred to in notes 103 and 114 supra) and, more
important, of the Ministry of Justice in a ruling published in 174 CLJ 38 (Apr. 25,
1960) and explained in 176 CLJ 2 (May 15, 1960), but the Tax Office of the Ministry
of Finance found difficulty in deciding whether the participation in excess of the fixed
interest would or w#ould not be a business expense to the issuer, 180 CLJ 16, (June 25,
1960). The issue was abandoned on the grounds that "economic instability makes the
timing premature" when the Banking Association cited a 1933 bank agreement, still in
force, to the effect that banks would not act with respect to, or subscribe to, any
unsecured debt security (a bank was to have been the trustee), 184 CLJ 44, (July 25,
1960). An official of the company admitted that the main reason why this unique (for
Japan) security was ever contemplated in the first place was certain circumstances
peculiar to the company, Yamamoto, Rieki Sanka Shasai no Hakko Keikaku (Plans
for Issuing Participating Debentures), 169 CLJ 20, (Mar. 15, 1960).
117 Gaishi ni Kan-surn Horitsu (Foreign Investment Law) Law No. 163 of 1950,
hereafter cited as the Foreign Investment Law.
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benefits not to be found in the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law"8 enacted the previous year which would otherwise have
governed foreign investment."
With the guarantees implicit in the Foreign Investment Law, the
integrity of the Japanese government was reinstated with the favorable
settlement in the early 1950's of Japan's prewar debt obligations; and
with economic and political stability, coupled with an unprecedented
growth rate, becoming more and more apparent as the 1950's pro-
gressed, foreign investment grew rapidly. Such investment took two
forms, direct investment by foreign entities, mainly corporations, on
a management participation, or joint venture, basis and investment
through the medium of the stock exchange.' Investment through the
stock exchange, almost all of which was in common stock in view of
the lack of a bond market and non-existence of preferred, grew from
$1,500,000 in 1951 to $124,800,000 in 1962.121
Up to 1959, 80% to 90% of all foreign investment was in the form
of loans, with 60% of such loans accounted for by the World Bank
and the U.S. Export-Import Bank. 2 Since 1960 the ratio of loans has
fallen to 60% to 70% with a corresponding rise in stock investment
from about 10% to 30%."8 Before 1959, joint venture investment
accounted for more than half of the stock investment, but the ratio of
stock market investment has risen sharply since then, reaching 90% in
the first half of 1962,124 by which time the holdings by foreigners had
reached 1.66% of listed stocks.'25
There were limits, however. First there were the restrictions of
11s Gaikoku Kawase oyobi Gaikoku Baeki Kanri Ho (Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law) Law No. 228 of 1949, hereafter cited as the Exchange Control
Law.
119 Briefly the distinction between the two laws as far as the foreign investor is
concerned lies in the fact that once he has received a "validation," i.e., approval, of his
investment under the Foreign Investment Law, he has an undertaking from the
Japanese government, personal to him, that the foreign exchange will be made avail-
able to remit interest and dividends, principal at maturity and, after the specified
holding period, the proceeds of sale of stock Under the Exchange Control Law the
most that the foreign investor received prior to 1960 was permission to buy the
security; nothing was said about remittance. See note 206 infra.
120 This article is concerned only with the latter.
121 Japanese language materials for use in the seminar entitled "A Comparative
Study of U.S. and Japanese Securities Laws" given under the sponsorship of the
Commercial Law Journal in Tokyo in October, 1962 by Louis Loss, Professor at
Harvard Law School, Part 3, p. 1, for the first figure and The Japan Economic Journal(Nihon Keizai Shimbun) Vol. 1, No. 6, p. 2, Feb. 5, 1963, for the second figure.
1222 The Investor, No. 27, 1, (Jan. 10, 1963).
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ministry of Finance survey as of March 31, 1962 as reported in 50 Japan Stock
Review 2 (Dec. 31, 1962).
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the Foreign Investment Law itself, principally the holding period, and
the restrictions grafted on by administrative interpretation, most no-
toriously the limitation on foreign equity holdings of Japanese com-
panies. 26 Second, there were the differences in customs between Japan
and foreign countries, particularly the United States. The Commer-
cial Code, despite United States grafting since 1950, is essentially of
the continental variety little understood by most Americans.Y-
The obvious solution to the first problem was relaxation of the
restrictions, which gradually took place. 8 As to the second, American
Depositary Receipts offered a good answer. 9 American Depositary
Receipts (generally known, and hereafter referred to, as ADR's)
had been well tested for securities of many other countries, 3 ' and
afforded Japan a means or raising equity capital through direct issues
in the United States that would not otherwise be available.''
Looked at from the Japanese side, loans and purchases of debt
securities by foreigners have always been welcome. When it comes
to equity investment, one detects a certain ambivalence. In the mid-
dle of the 1950's the Japanese government registered disappointment
that it was not higher,"3 2 but this was while Western European growth
was in full swing and before Castro had come to cast his shadow over
126 This is of more concern to the joint venture investor rather than the investor
through the stock exchange, particularly since the Ministry of Finance in May 1961
enunciated its policy of validating "as a matter of course" acquisitions through the
stock exchange of up to 15% in the aggregate of the stock of Japanese companies
(10% in the case of "restricted" companies such as utilities, banks, transportation
companies, shipping companies, and the like).
127 This problem as well as that of the restrictions, was recognized by Japanese
writers, at least by 1960, when with Japan showing a surplus on international trans-
actions for the first time in 30 years, talk of liberalization was in the air, see Ishikawa,
Kabushiki no Kokusai Torihiki to Sono Mondaiten (Some Problems in Connection
with International Stock Transactions), 169 CLJ 10, (Mar. 15, 1960).
125 A big step was taken in May, 1961 with the shortening of the holding period for
stock to two years by elimination of the requirement of installment repatriation over
a five year period, the creation of Non-Resident Yen Accounts for funds not directly
eligible for remittance, which could be sold to other foreigners or used for other
purposes leading to remittability, and the "matter of course" policy referred to in
note 126 supra.
129 This was clearly recognized by the Japanese. See Ishikawa, supra note 127,
where ADRs were described as "essential" for Japanese stock.
130 By 1961 there were ADRs for over 150 issues, with Great Britain heading the
list with 78, the Union of South Africa following with 20, West Germany with 19 and
the rest found for a wide variety of countries including Italy, the Netherlands,
Australia, France, Mexico and Brazil, of which seven were traded on the New York
Stock Exchange, 29 on the American Stock Exchange and the remainder over-the-
counter, see Merjos, More ADRs-Buying Foreign Securities in the U.S. Gets Easier
All the Time, Barron's, (Jan. 23, 1961), p. 9, reporting on a survey of ADRs made
by Barron's.
131 Ishikawa, supra note 127.
132 COHEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 127, 130. As the author points out, it was the
rules and the attitude of the government itself which kept foreign investment down.
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Latin America. Later, with the improvement in Japan's foreign ex-
change position, her continued growth and stability and prospects for
liberalization, Japanese stocks became increasingly attractive to
foreign investors.
At this juncture a note of caution crept into the comments of Japa-
nese in all walks of life. It was openly stated that given her different
social system and national traits, it was better for Japan to have
foreign investment in the form of loans rather than equity, which
carries with it management participation."8 Others recognized, how-
ever, that the average foreign investor was not interested in straight
debt securities." 4 The lesson of a quarter century of world-wide
inflation had not been missed. He would have to have equity if he
was to be attracted in large numbers. 5 But this raised fears, on the
part of the government, of management influence, if not control, by
foreigners with resultant disruption of the government's economic
plans and policies to which Japanese companies adhered as a matter
of course.:38 As a solution some government circles suggested the use
of non-voting stock for foreigners to separate share ownership from
management participation,3 ' or at least limiting his right to elect
directors, although it was admitted this might be contrary to the
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between the United States and
133 Sasaki, Gutaika Dankai ni Hairu Gaishi Donyu (Foreign Capital Induction
Enters the Concrete stage), 200 CLJ 15, (Dec. 25, 1960/Jan. 5, 1961).
134 Sasaki, Gaisai Hakko ni Kan suru Sho Mondai-Nyu Yoku ni oite Hakko suru
baai no Mondaiten (Some Problems Relating to the Issuance of Foreign Debentures-
Problems in the Case of Issues in New York), 169 CLJ 2, (Mar. 15, 1960).
135The Mainchi Daily News (English language edition), American Depositary
Receipts Supplement, (Dec. 18, 1960), p. 13.136 Otsirtake, Gaishi Donyu to Sangyo Seisaku (Foreign Capital Induction and
Production Policy), 170 CLJ 2, (Mar. 21, 1960). The author is an official of the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). See also Lingering Fears of
Foreign Capitals-Complex Regulations Still Tie Up Foreign Investors Seeking Par-
ticipation in Japanese Management, 1 The Investor, No. 24, 1 (Nov. 22, 1962), where
it is pointed out that the fear stems in part from the fact that "in the bleak years after
the war, about $200 million would have bought up control of practically all major
Japanese Corporations" Actually these fears are greatly exaggerated as is shown by
the fact as noted above (text at note 125), that foreign investors in 1962 held only
1.66% of listed stock, hardly enough to control anything, even allowing for concen-
tration in certain industries. But there fears are not confined to Japan. At any rate they
are prevalent in the France of Charles de Gaulle; see Chrysler move rouses France-
Government wants EEC to curb foreign investment in reaction to Chryler's increased
ownership of Simca, fourth largest French auto manufacturer, Busixnss WMK, No.
1743 at 100 (Jan. 26, 1963), where it is pointed out that despite Simca's assurances
that the acquisition would not affect top management the French government was
uneasy because it "felt that U.S.-controlled companies too often show little concern for
local economic conditions."
137 Id. See also the views of a Ministry of Justice Official, Yoshida, Shihon Tori-
hiki no Jiyuka to Mugiketsuken Kabu (The Liberalization of Stock Transactions and
Non-Voting Stock), 169 CLJ 14, (Mar. 15, 1960).
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Japan.' The fact that visiting investment groups had indicated that
the average investor was not interested in management participation
was not enough.'
Upon examination, however, non-voting stock was found wanting.
4
In the first place the Commercial Code... confined it to preferred stock
and to one quarter of the outstanding capital. It was admitted it
would not appeal to most foreigner investors who might feel they were
getting a second-class security.'42 Instead, Japanese management
was advised to take certain countermeasures such as increasing domes-
tic stock issues, encouraging management and employee stock pur-
chases, and the like.'43
With fears of management domination laid to one side, Japan moved
ahead in 1960 to 1961 to clear the way for issues of equity securities
in the United States. In December, 1960 the Ministry of Finance
accepted the ADR system and announced a list of 16 candidate com-
panies to issue equity securities in the United States evidenced or
accompanied by ADR's." The way was prepared for the issue abroad
of Japanese equity securities."4
Stock and ADR Issues in the United States. Of the 16 candidates,
the company selected as the first to issue a security in the United
States was Sony Corporation, a famous electronics concern well known
in the United States through its excellent products, which were being
marketed there in increasing quantities.4 6 Sony was recognized as an
ideal first candidate with its small, compact size, excellent reputation
and strong growth characteristics. "7 In addition Sony had placated
138 Ishikawa, supra note 127.
139 Yoshida, supra note 94.
140 Ishikawa, supra note 127.
141 COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 242.
142 Ishikawa, supra note 127.
143 Ibid.
144 202 CLJ 6, (Feb. 5, 1961). At the same time the Ministry selected ADR deposi-
taries from among New York banks and custodians from among Japanese banks which
were then paired off and assigned companies among the 16 candidates. The 16 included
all those who have issued equity-type securities in the United States so far, see note 2
supra.
145 There had been a number of bond issues abroad before the war, particularly in
the 1920's and then again after the war commencing with the Japanese government
bond issue in 1959.
146 Of Sony's production 42% was exported, 30% to the United States, SONY
CORPORATION, BEIKOKU SHIJO Ni OKERU KARUSHIKI KoBo To ADR-SoNY No
SENREI KARA (ADR and Public Stock Offering in the American Market-the Sony
Precedent), 5 (Tokyo, 1962).
147 Watanabe, Beikoku no Shijo ni Okeru Hompo Kabushiki no Kobo to Sono
Mondaiten (Some Problems in Public Offerings of Japanese Stock in the American
Market), 213 CLJ 2, (June 5, 1961).
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its stockholders with a one-for-one rights offering, a one-for-ten free
distribution, and Japanese investors in general with a public offering
in Japan of 2,200,000 shares, or about 6% of the shares outstanding
after the resultant capital increase,'48 thereby following the advice
of the Securities Exchange Council's report to the Ministry of Finance
and of other commentators.'49
With no precedents in Japan for a public offering of stock in the
United States, the legal problems faced were formidable. The United
States SEC registration statement required a full explanation of the
relevant Japanese laws in terms meaningful to an American reader.
Every precaution had to be taken also that all relevant laws of both
countries were complied within connection with the authorization and
issuance of the stock and the ADR'sY °
At the outset the attorneys involved' 5 ' were faced with the meaning,
within the context of a public offering in the United States, of the
second paragraph of article 280-2 of the Commercial Code, to the
effect that the granting of preemptive rights to others than stockhold-
ers requires a special resolution of stockholders, i.e., a two-thirds vote
of a quorum consisting of a majority of the outstanding stock."2
Except for this vague provision stock may be issued by board of di-
rector action alone.
The problem was a delicate one because, as noted earlier in this
article, shareholder approval had never been obtained in connection
with public offerings in Japan, which were handled in much the same
way as public offerings in the United States in that the underwriters
14sAt the beginning of 1961 Sony had 18,000,000 shares outstanding with a par
value of T50 per share and a per share market value in the vicinity of Y1,400. The
public offering in Japan took place in April, 1961 at a price of Y590 per share or 10%
below the then market price of about 655 per share, which had been reduced as a
result of the free distribution of 1,800,000 shares and the rights offering at the par
value of Y50 per share of 18,000,000 shares at the same time. For the details, see SoNY,
op. cit. supra note 146, at 8, 31, and Watanabe, supra note 147.
'1'9 See text and notes under discussion of public offering versus rights offering,
supra.
150 For the problems faced in connection with the public offering of foreign securi-
ties in the United States, see Stevenson, Legal Aspects of the Public Offering of For-
eign Securities it; the United States Market, 28 Ga. WAsR. L. REv. 194-213 (1959).
25, It has been customary to have both company and underwriters' counsel in Tokyo,
in addition to underwriters' counsel in New York.
152 Because of its importance and the controversy surrounding it, the second para-
graph of the Article is quoted in full:
"In giving the pre-emptive rights to new shares to persons other than the share-
holders, the resolution provided for in Article 343 shall, even in the case where the
articles of incorporation provide for thereon, be made as to whether the shares subject
to be pre-emptive rights are those having par value or those without par value, the
class, the number, and the minimum issue-price. In such case, the directors shall, in
a general meeting of shareholders, show the reason why it is necessary to give the
pre-emptive rights to new shares to persons other than the shareholders."
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purchased for resale to the public under contract, all the stock being
publicly offered. A full investigation was made of all the authorities
including an interview with Professor Suzuki of the Tokyo University
Law School, one of the participants in the drafting of the provision
in question.
Although there has been much written since, and squarely in point
since the subsequent writing was sparked by the decision made in
the case of the Sony offering,"'3 there was little available material at
the time the decision had to be made. The provision in question had
only been inserted in the Code in 1955, making of little help the
treatises written prior to that date."4
In the face of the literal meaning of the provision, statements 5 to
the effect that since the underwriters intend to resell to the general
public there is no problem, offer little comfort. Preemptive rights to
third persons have been defined as the rights given to persons other
than stockholders to receive preferential allocation of specific shares. 5 '
This is certainly the case in an underwritten public offering. The
underwriters, not the stockholders, buy, or rather subscribe to, the
shares. There is no obligation on the underwriters to sell only to
stockholders. They may sell to any one. Under the circumstances
it would appear that the underwriters have preemptive rights as soon
as they sign the underwriting agreement with the issuer.
Now it may be that it was not the intention that public offerings
through underwriters be considered the granting of preemptive rights
to third parties. 8 The offering price is near the market price so
that the amount of harm, if any, done to the old stockholders is kept
to a minimum, although the old shareholders see their percentage par-
153 See notes 158 to 161, inclusive, infra.
154 SUZUKI AND IsaiI, op. cit. supra note 26, and OsuMI AND OMoRI, Op. cit. supra
note 26, written in 1950 and 1951, respectively, in response to the 1950 Amendment
contain little of value on the subject.155 See YAMAICHI, op. cit. supra note 45, at 339.
156 Fujisawa, in Shin Kabu Hikiukeken (Pre-emptive Rights to New Stock),
KABUSmI KoSA, Vol. IV. 1264 (1957).
157 It is the general view that in the case of third parties the obligation of the
company to issue stock pursuant to a pre-emptive right comes into existence only when
the necessary corporate authorization has been followed, or preceded, by a contract
between the company and the third parties specifying the terms, id., 1266-1268.
158 This is the position of most of those who oppose the view that a public offering
through underwriters constitutes the granting of pre-emptive rights. It is stated that
offering through underwriters is merely a mechanical convenience since the end result
is the same as if there were no underwriters, i.e., the general public, and not the under-
writers, ends up as the new stockholders, although it is not denied that the under-
writers are the initial stockholders taking the share certificates in their name and
endorsing them over to their purchasers, Yoshida (Ministry of Justice official), Kaitori
Hikiuke Keiyaku to Shinkabu Hikiukeken (The Underwriting by Purchase Contract
and Preemptive Rights), 218 CLJ 2, (July 25, 1961).
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ticipation in the management diminish.'59 Perhaps price is the im-
portant criterion and what article 280-2, paragraph 2, was designed
to prevent was the granting to non-stockholders, without special stock-
holder approval, of the right to subscribe to stock at par or very
substantially below the market as is the custom in Japan in stock-
holder rights offerings.' But this is by no means clear, and there
have been some with doubts.'
Whatever the merits of these arguments, no chances could be taken
with an international issue to be registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The consequences of being wrong, or even
of being subject to unjust attack and then vindicated, were just too
great. 2 Therefore, in keeping with that tried and true maxim that
discretion is the better part of valor, stockholder approval was insisted
upon and obtained.' The wisdom of the conservative course has
' 
59 Yatsuki, Daisantsha no Shinkabu Hikiukeken (Pre-emptive Rights to Third
Parties), 78 CLJ 12, (Oct. 5/15, 1957), where the author, a Professor of law at Kobe
University, takes the position that such harm is the inevitable consequence of the
stockholders' loss of their pre-emptive rights in the 1955 Amendment.
160 This is the implication from statements in Izawa, Shinkabu Hakko no Tetsuzuki,
(Procedure for Issuing New Stock), KABusHiKI KOZA, Vol. IV, 1210 (1957) and in
Yamaichi Securities, Kobo (Public Offering), 253 CLJ 8, (Aug. 5/15, 1962). Pro-
fessor Yazawa takes this position in stressing the importance of a fair price in a
public offering through underwriters in the round table discussion of the Corporation
Law Study Group published under the title of Kabushiki Kobo no Mondaiten (Prob-
lems of Public Offering of Stock), 233 Juristo 6, 23 (Sept. 1, 1961).
361 See Daisansha ni Taisuru Shinkabu Hikiukeken no Fuyo (Granting of Pre-
emptive Rights to Third Parties), 258 CL] 15, (Oct. 5, 1962), where the anonymous
author states that while an offering direct to the public would not involve pre-emptive
rights, the presence of underwriters "blurs the distinction." See also Yonedzu, Kaitori
Hikikuke wa Daison sha Wariate ni naru ka (Does an Underwriting by Purchase
Constitute an Allocation to Third Parties?), ZAIsEI KEiZAI Koao (Financial and
Economic Journal) No. 979 at 4 (Feb. 25, 1963), where the author, a professor of law,
flatly declares that an underwriting involves the grant of pre-emptive rights to third
parties.
162 For the importance in public offerings in the United States of the validity and
due authorization of the security, see Stevenson, supra note 150, at 196. As added
reasons for wanting stockholder approval there was the fact that unlike the case of a
domestic public offering, the Japanese stockholders could not, because of foreign
exchange controls, buy to protect their position. There was also the view expressed
by some that stockholder approval was necessary to bring about a binding obligation
on the part of the company to issue the stock pursuant to the underwriting agreement
on the theory that only one who has been given pre-emptive rights has the right to
demand the issue of the security, see Yoshida, supra note 147, and again in
Kaitori Hikiuke to Shoho Dai 280 no 2 Dai 2-Ko (Article 280-2, Paragraph 2 of the
Commercial Code and Underwriting by Purchase), 268 CLJ 2, (Jan. 25, 1963). This
apparently was the view of Sony itself, see SoNY, op. cit. supra note 146, at 60.
Japanese underwriting agreements contain no obligation on the part of the company to
issue or sell to the underwriters, Yoshida, supra note 158, but this is not the case in
United States underwriting agreements where the underwriters insist on mutuality.
163 Sony felt very strongly that pre-emptive rights were not involved because the
offering price was near the market price. Since it felt stockholder action was therefor
not called for, it felt none could be asked even as a precaution in view of the provision
of the CommRClAL CODE, art. 230-2, that stockholder resolutions shall only be adopted
as to matters provided for in the CODE or the articles of incorporation, ignoring the
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since been proven by a decision of the Yokohama District Court in
the case of a public offering by Toshiba in the spring of 1961 that a
public offering through underwriters constituted the granting of
preemptive rights to the underwriters." 4
The stockholder approval itself is quite simple, being confined to
a minimum offering price which could be, and was, expressed as
"not less than par," leaving to the directors the fixing of the actual
price, the maximum and actual number of shares, and the class, i.e.,
par value common stock. The directors are then free to fix the actual
offering price and number of chares to be offered at their meeting im-
mediately before the effectiveness of the registration statement in the
United States and the commencement there of the public offering.
With such a short interval between the fixing of the price and the
offering, and with the offering price generally fixed at no more than
10% to 15% below the market price, there is little danger of attack
under article 280-10 of the Commercial Code for having sold at a
"grossly unfair" price.
Once the question of stockholder approval had been resolved, the
question of Japanese government approvals remained to be worked
out. The issuance of the stock had to have approval under the Ex-
fact that if a resolution under article 280-2 were adopted when not needed its invalidity
under article 230-2 would be of no consequence whereas if it were needed, article
230-2 would not apply. At any rate, the compromise solution was adopted by an
amendment to Sony's articles to the effect that sale of stock abroad except by a
rights offering would require a special resolution of the stockholders. The stockholder
approval of the United States offering was obtained pursuant to this new provision of
the articles. This same practice has been followed in each of the subsequent public
offerings of stock in the United States except in the case of Toshiba where no newly
issued stock was involved, a subsidiary being the seller. For Sony's position, see SONY,
op. cit. supra note 146, at 58-60. It is interesting to note that despite fears of adverse
stockholder reaction, stockholder approval was unanimous, a rare event for a publicly
held company.
'I6 Nakajima v. Tokyo Shibaura Electric Co., Ltd., Yokohama District Court, (Dec.
17, 1962), "WA"-No. 873 (1961), as reported in 266 CLJ 14, (Dec. 25, 1962). The
Court declined to void the issue under article 280-15 which would have been the logical
result except for the importance attached in Japan to the principle of safety of trans-
actions whereby a security once issued to the public is by custom untouchable with the
plaintiff stockholder instead of remedy against the directors for damages under article
266, Paragraph 1, item 5, or, if he moves quickly enough, an action for an injunction
to suspend the issuance under article 280-10 before it is made, see YAMAICHI, op. cit.
supra note 45, at 339, and Nihon Keizei Shimbun, Dec. 20, 1962 containing comments
on the decision, and Yoshida, Article 280-2 of the Commercial Code and Underwriting
by Purchase, supra note 162. See also Yonedzu, supra note 161, where the doctrine of
"safety transactions" is stressed. In three cases involving the same plaintiff and same
subject matter as Nakajima v. Tokyo Shibaura Electric Co., Ltd., supra, the Tokyo
District Court ignored the question of pre-emptive rights and upheld the three issues in
question on the grounds of "safety of transactions ;" Nakajima v. Taisei Constr. Co.
Ltd., "WA" No. 3337 (1961) ; Nakajima v. Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd., "WA" No.
4529 (1961) ; and Nakajima v. Kisha Seizo Co., Ltd., "WA" No. 4908 (1961), all
decided by the Tokyo District Court on February 4, 1963 and all reported in 270 CLJ
12, 13 and 16 respectively (Feb. 15, 1963).
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change Control Law65 and the ADR holders had to have the full
benefits available under the Foreign Investment Law while the com-
pany needed approval under the Exchange Control Law for the deposit
agreement with the ADR depositary in New York.
The first approval was obtained by Sony in the form of a "license
on issuance or flotation of securities" issued immediately following the
determination of the issue price by the board of directors and just prior
to the SEC effectiveness and the signing of the underwriting
agreement."' The benefits of the Foreign Investment Law were as-
sured by the underwriters obtaining validations for the stock under
article 11 and the ADR depositary a designation under article 13-2
whereby the benefits of the underwriters' validations were transferred
to the depositary (the legal holders of the stock) on behalf of the
ADR holders (the beneficial owners)."' The approval of the deposit
agreement took the form of a service contract license obtained by Sony
pursuant to article 42 of the Exchange Control Law and article 17 of
the Cabinet Order Concerning Control of Foreign Exchange. 6
The deposit agreement raised the problem as to whether a split
vote is possible under Japanese law. "9 The weight of authority seems
to be that it is,17 but there has been some hesitation in view of the fact
there has never been a court decision on the subject. 1 But this is
gradually disappearing, removing one more problem in the path of
ADR issues of Japanese securities.'
165 Article 34 requires a license under the Ministry of Ordinance Concerning Con-
trol of Securities, MOF Ordinance No. 70 of 1950, for the "flotation of securities
abroad."
106 The license included permission for Sony to remit in dollars the United States
expenses of the offering including the underwriters' commission.
l671mmediately upon receipt the underwriters turned the stock over to the custodian
in Tokyo against the issue to them of the ADRs in New York for sale to the public.
168 Cabinet Order 203 of 1950.
160 The depositary in the agreement undertakes to use his best efforts to vote the
related underlying stock in accordance with the wishes of each ADR holder.
170 literal reading of the pertinent provision of the Coat CIciL CODE (art. 241)
indicates without a doubt that split voting is permitted since it states that "each share-
holder shall have one vote for each share." This language indicates that the vote is
merely an accumulation of units so that it can be split, rather than a personal attribute
which could not. See Hishida, Giketusken no Futoitsu Koshi (Exercise of Split
Voting), 258 CLJ 17, (Oct. 5, 1962). Professor Hishida summarizes the authorities
and comes to the conclusion that the favorable view is in the ascendency if for no other
reason than that the complexities of modern economic life require a split vote in view
of the growth of trusts and indeed of ADRs. To the same effect is Yazawa in the
round table conference of members of the Corporation Law Study Group reported
under the title Kaigai ni okeru Shoken Hakko (Issuing Securities Abroad), 262
Juristo 6, 14 (Nov. 15, 1962).
171 See comment by Professor Suzuki, another participant in the round table,
Issuing Securities Abroad, id. at 14.
172 An undertaking to permit split voting would be a necessity for listing on the
New York Stock Exchange. At present such listing is not possible anyway because
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The SEC registration imposed considerable problems and expense,
at least in comparison with those to which Japanese companies are
accustomed in domestic public offerings." 3 The degree of disclosure
required came at times as a surprise 74 while the undertaking to regis-
ter future rights offerings with the SEC for the benefit of United
States stock and ADR holders imposed a continuing obligation on the
company for the benefit of a minority of the stockholders." 5
Despite the problems, however, the trail having been blazed, other
companies followed in Sony's footsteps and indications are they will
be followed by others.'
Convertible Debenture Issues in the United States. Stock issues
in the United States proved themselves to be a promising source of
equity funds, but the source was limited. Japanese stock issues had to
face competition from a large number of both United States and
foreign, mainly Canadian and Western European, issuers. In addition
the sharp break in the United States stock markets in May, 1962 con-
stricted the market for new stock issues while making U.S. stocks
more competitive by greatly reducing price-earnings ratios. At the
same time large sources of funds in the United States could not be
tapped because of the limitation imposed on the various financial
institutions by federal and state laws on the holding of stock, particu-
of the Japanese exchange controls, principally the six months' holding period require-
ment for stock.
173 The cost of the Sony offering was estimated to be about three times that of an
offering of the same size in Japan, Watanabe, supra note 147. The public offering
price was the equivalant of Y631 per share, or about 14% below the market price
compared with 10% below in the case of Sony's public offering in Japan, but Sony
was content with the result despite the greater discount and higher cost because of the
public relations advantages obtained. SONY, op. cit. supra note 146, at 8. The Ministry
of Finance was satisfied also, feeling that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages,
Watanabe, supra note 147.
174 See Outmoded Accounting and Tax System-Extensive Overhauling Needed to
Straighten Out Confusing Japanese Corporation Accounting Practices and Tax
Methods, 1 The Investor, No. 22, 1, where at p. 2 it is stated that the Sony registra-
tion statement "for example, contains a mass of information stated with an exactitude
and in terms which would be unthinkable by conventional Japanese accounting and
business practices."
175 With the offering of Sony's stock via ADRs in the United States foreign hold-
ings approached 15% and subsequently passed that amount, at one time approaching
20%, the new "matter of course" limitation for validations established by th Ministry
of Finance for Sony.
176 Mitsubishi Chemical took the as yet novel route of issuing notes and stock to
investors on a private placement basis in the autumn of 1961. For a description of this
transaction see an account by one of the company officials, Hfimeda, Wagasha ni okeru
Puromisarri Noto Oyobi Kabushiki no Hakko ni tsuite (Concerning the Issuance of
Stock and Promissory Notes by Our Company), 230 CLJ 2, (Dec. 15, 1961). While
not exactly in point for this article since it represented investment coming to Japan
rather than a Japanese issue abroad, The Japan Fund, a United States incorporated,
closed end investment company, was formed in April, 1962 with the sale of $15,625,000
worth of stock and the intention of investing primarily in Japanese growth stocks.
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larly stock of foreign issuers. On the other hand straight bonds which
the financial institutions could purchase without restriction had little
appeal to the institutions. If they were to commit their funds abroad,
at least in private companies, they wanted a stake in the equity.
7
The only answer was to issue convertible debentures to supplement
the stock issues, thereby appealing to the broadest possible spectrum
of investors."' The fact that convertible debentures would be an
appropriate medium for foreign investment was clearly recognized in
Japan." 9 It was only a matter of time until the first issue was brought
out. As it happened two came out simultaneously in September, 1962:
Hitachi, Ltd. on a private placement basis and Shin Mitsubishi as
a public offering with SEC registration.
As in the case of the issue of stock, there was an important question
to be answered before the issues could proceed. Here it was the ques-
tion as to whether and to what extent the law of the place of issuance,
namely New York, could, by agreement between the parties, govern
the debentures.
If unsecured, and all of the issues to date have been unsecured,
convertible debentures are governed by the provisions of § 5 of the
Commercial Code.'80 The provisions of § 5 with respect to convertible
debentures incorporate by reference certain provisions of the Code
dealing with convertible stock. 8' Section 5 consists of three subsec-
tions: subsection 1,182 which is concerned with the limitation on the
amount of debentures to be issued, issuance procedures and transfers;
"7 Beginning in 1961 there have been a number of straight debt issues, but not
enough, and no prospect of enough, to satisfy Japanese industry's thirst for investment
funds.
178By process of elimination this was the only combination equity-debt security
available to Japanese issuers. Debentures with warrants attached cannot be issued
under the CoMMcrAI. CODE if the warrants have a life of over six months because of
paragraph 4 of article 280-2, as we have seen. Participating debentures, while
theoretically possible under the CoDn, have not engendered much enthusiasm in Japan,
the one abortive issue leaving a legacy of unanswered questions; see note 116 supra.
One company issued a combination of stock and notes privately in the United States,
but there has been no sign of a desire for a repeat performance in either Japan or the
U.S., quite possibly because convertible debentures offer more flexibility. See Sasaki,
supra note 133, where it is stated that combination issues are done in the United States
only by unpopular companies.
179 The Securities Exchange Council in its report to the Ministry of Finance, supra
note 6, while disparaging the local issues suggested convertible debentures for foreign
investors, while others pointed out the popularity of convertible debentures in the
United States, Sasald, supra note 133, and the fact that convertible debentures with
features to which foreign investors are accustomed could be issued under Japanese law,
Ohtori, Special Debentures, supra note 103.
180 Co ~ERciAL CODE, arts. 296 to 341-5.
Is" Id., arts. 222-2, para. 2; 222-3; 222-5, para. 3; 222-6; and222-7.
2 8 2 Id., arts. 296 to 318.
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subsection 2... which concerns debenture holder meetings; and sub-
section 3184 which relates to the issuance and conversion of convertible
debentures. In applying to debentures in general, sub sections 1 and 2
apply to convertible debentures.
In issuing bonds or debentures abroad, it is desirable to have the
terms and governing provisions as close as possible to those to which
the foreign investor and foreign market are accustomed. It makes
the issue that much more salable and on better terms than would
otherwise be possible. At any rate, tailoring the security to the cus-
toms and laws of the place of issue has been followed in practice for
a number of years and has received the blessing of authorities in the
field of conflict of laws.18 It remained to be seen if Japanese law
would permit the same practice with respect to Japanese debentures,
particularly convertible debentures. 8
In addition to general desire to have the convertible debentures
conform as much as possible to United States practice, the under-
writers and their counsel were particularly concerned about several
provisions of the Commercial Code which differed quite radically from
debenture provisions found in the United States. The first were the
provisions of the Commercial Code'87 to the effect that acceleration
could be brought about only by default in the payment of principal
or interest and even then only if preceded by a resolution adopted in
a debenture holders meeting and by advance notice to the company. In
contrast the usual United States debenture indenture provides for
acceleration in the event of any material breach of the indenture or
the debentures including but certainly not limited to default in the
payment of principal or interest. Furthermore it provides that such
acceleration shall take place upon the demand of not less than a
specified minority of the debentures, usually one-quarter, without the
necessity of a meeting and without advance notice to the company.
183 Id., arts. 319 to 341.
184 Id., arts. 341-2 to 341-5.
185 The practice first became widespread in the 1920's, although it has no doubt been
present in some form almost since money was first loaned across international bound-
aries; see RABEL, 3 THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 11-31 (1950).
186 The prewar Japanese bonds issued in the United States had been governed by
Japanese law; postwar debt issues in the United States had either been "notes" as to
which the COMMERCIAL CODE did not apply, or were bonds of semi-government entities,
as to which special legislation relating to applicable law had been enacted, permitting
the bonds to be governed in many respects under the laws and customs of the place of
issuance, as, for example, the bonds of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company
(NTT) issued in April, 1961, as to which see Article 9-2 of the Telegraph and Tele-
phone Bonds Order, Cabinet Order 507 of 1952 as amended in 1961 for this purpose.
187 COM-MEACIAL CODE, arts. 334, 335.
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To make matters worse the Commercial Code requires that before
they can take effect, all resolutions must be approved by a court
having jurisdiction over the head office of the issuer.' The thought
of having to apply to and receive the approval of a Japanese court
before their resolution could take effect could give pause to even the
hardiest United States investors.
To cite another troublesome problem, the Commercial Code requires
a quorum of only a majority, and a majority or, in some cases, a two-
thirds vote of that quorum to adopt a resolution.8 9 On the other hand,
United States indentures usually require the affirmative vote of two-
thirds of the total outstanding, and in exceptional cases, the unanimous
vote of all the debentures. 90
The question of applicable law was given careful study by the coun-
sel involved who consulted several noted Japanese scholars for their
views. '9 A unanimity of view was reached which may be briefly
described as follows:' 92
Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Application of Laws in General
(known in Japanese, and hereafter referred to, as the "Horei")"'9
provides, in effect, that the applicable law is to be that determined by
the intention of the parties and if no intention is expressed, the law of
the place where the act is done, will apply. That article 7 of the Horei
applies to foreign currency debt securities has not been in doubt since
the decision of the Supreme Court of Japan in 1934 with respect to
the Tokyo City French Currency Bonds in 1912.1'" That portion of the
decision applying article 7 has the almost unanimous support of the
Japanese scholars.' 9
Article 30 of the Horei, which provides an exception in the case of a
violation of public policy, is not applicable since the differences be-
188 Id., art. 327.
189 Id., art. 324.
'00 The requirement of unanimity is found in the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
Section 316, with respect to change in maturity. Publicly offered debentures are subject
to the Act...
191 Professors Egawa, Yazawa, Ohtori, and Ikehara.
192 The views of the last three were set forth in a joint written opinion which was
published in modified form by Professor Yazawa under the title Tenkan Shasai no
Kokusaiteki Hakko (International Issuance of Convertible Debentures), 258 CLJ 26,
(Oct. 5, 1962). Professor Egawa provided a separate opinion.
193 Horei (Law Concerning the Application of Laws) Law No. 10 of 1898.
'94 Supreme Court, 1st Civil Section Decision, (Dec. 27,1934). "O"-No. 2981 (1933);
Minshu Vol. 13, No. 23, p. 2386, where it was held that in the absence of an expression
of intent by the parties, the laws of the place of issue, namely France, applied according
to article 7 of the Horei, and therefore the currency clause was invalid as contrary
to the laws of France.195 Yazawa, .rupra note 192.
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tween United States law and practice and those of Japan did not
go to fundamentals, as is shown by the fact that another Japanese
law dealing with secured debt securities, the Secured Bonds Trust
Law,196 has provisions differing from those in the Commercial Code
on the questions of acceleration,'97 effectiveness of debenture holders
resolutions, 9 ' and the requirements for such resolutions.199 Further-
more, public policy is aimed at protecting the debenture holders rather
than the issuing company which has received money in exchange for
its paper, and since the debenture holders are resident abroad, their
protection is not a matter of Japanese public policy, but of the place
of issue or where they reside."'
The expression of intention of the parties imposed no problem. It
could be very specifically set out in the indenture. The only question
remaining was the extent to which it was possible to contract out of
Japanese law. In this connection the conclusion was that the legal
provisions relating to the authorization and issuance of the deben-
tures and their conversion had to be governed by Japanese law for
the reason that the issuer was a Japanese entity and the conversion
was into stock which was a Japanese security. On this basis, the
fact that the debentures were convertible posed no problem. The
provisions contracted out of by specific provision in the indenture
were those in the Commercial Code relating to debentures in general.
Article 341-2 of the Commercial Code specifically provides for
stockholder approval for the issuance of convertible debentures." 1 The
stockholders have to determine the conditions of conversion, particu-
lars as to the shares to be issued on conversion and the conversion
period. The stockholders meeting could be held close enough to the
date of issue to permit most of the matters for determination thereat
to be decided with safety, so that the company and the underwriters
would not find themselves locked in by a resolution of the stockholders
on the one hand and a change in market conditions on the other.02
196 Tampo-suki Shasai Shintaku Ho (Security Bonds Trust Law) Law No. 52 of
1905.
197 COMMERCIAL CODE, arts. 79, 80 and 81.
198 Id., art. 57.
199 Id., art. 52.
200 That this is the intention of Japanese jurisprudence is borne out by COMMERCIAL
CODE, art. 483, which provides for the application of Japanese law to foreign issues in
Japan in those matters relating to the protection of the holders.
201 In the alternative, they could be authorized by the articles of incorporation, but
this was not practical.
202 There is less of a problem in a private placement which is usually negotiated well
in advance of the date of issue and thus immune to other than catastrophic changes in
conditions.
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The exception is the initial conversion price, which is the most
delicate of the terms since in effect it determines what the company
gives up in the way of stock for the principal amount of the issue,
subject of course to adjustment by virtue of the anti-dilution formula.
This subject can be handled by the stockholders approving a fixed
formula for automatically determining a minimum price above which
the directors can fix the actual price in their discretion, thereby meet-
ing the approval requirements of the Code while at the same time
allowing flexibility for unseen developments.2 3 There is no problem
about the fairness of the price since it is customary to fix the initial
conversion price at or above the current market price of the stock.
The anti-dilution formula, expressed as it is in objective terms,
is legal when approved by the stockholders among the "conditions of
conversion," provided that it does not result in the conversion of the
stock at a price less than its par value, taking into account the amount
of yen received by the company at the time of issue of the debentures
on the basis of the exchange rate at such time.2°0
The Japanese government approvals vary from those in the case
of issuance of stock. The issuing company makes application to the
Minister of Finance pursuant to a Ministry notification"'5 which pro-
vides that once a "notice of recognition" is issued thereunder, the
issuer may not only issue the security, but may make all the necessary
remittances abroad to service the security and pay the expenses of
issuance, including the underwriters' commission.0 Prior to the
issuance of the debentures, the purchasers obtain validation of the
stock issuable upon conversion at any time during the life of the
issue, thereby assuring themselves in advance that the stock received
on conversion will have the remittance benefits of the Foreign Invest-
ment Law." 7
203 See Yazawa, in Kaigai ni Okeru Shoken Hakko (Issuances of Securities
Abroad), 262 Juristo 6 (Nov. 15, 1962), who recognizes the practical requirements
and holds that they can be met within the framework of the CODE.
204 Ibid. Also, Yazawa, International Issuance of Convertible Debentures, supra
note 192.
205 Ministry of Finance Notification No. 286 (December 12, 1960).
206 The Notification represents a departure from the Exchange Control Law in that
it not only permits the issue of the security but authorizes the necessary remittance as
well. Without the Notification procedure the issuer would have to obtain permission to
issue under article 34 of the Law and then make a separate application for each pay-
ment throughout the life of the issue pursuant to article 27, hardly an appealing prospect
for either the issuer or the holder.
207 To facilitate the issuance of convertible debentures, the Ministry of Finance
made an exception to its usual rule that validated stock must be acquired within six
months of the validation. In the case of debentures publicly issued the ADR depositary
obtains the validation, rather than the purchasers, since the purchasers will receive
ADR 's upon conversion with the stock issued in the name of the depositary.
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In conclusion one further problem merits attention. The Commer-
cial Code provides'" that conversion may not be made during the
period the stock register is closed." 9 Since almost all Japanese com-
panies have the closure system and since the register is often closed at
least four months a year for stockholders meetings alone, it has been
found necessary for companies issuing convertible debentures to amend
their articles of incorporation to provide for the novel, to Japan, record
date system.210
CONCLUSION
As this is written there appears to be no let up in the issue in the
United States of stock and convertible debentures by Japanese com-
panies.211 There is also talk of offerings in London.212 This is as it should
be. Capital is a commodity like any other, and its free flow is essen-
tial to bind nations together and provide better standards of living.
Japan has come far since the dark days of the 1940's. But much
remains to be done. The yen is in reality one of the strongest of cur-
rencies,212 but it is fettered by a rigid system of controls, particularly
on capital transactions. There has been much talk of liberalization,
but Japan's economic strength has grown beyond the liberalization
that has actually taken place. What is needed is a wholesale relaxa-
tion of controls to permit Japanese industry to tap, without any restric-
tion other than the rules of the market place, the capital that is avail-
able abroad for investment in a country that combines rapid growth
with economic and political stability, rare ingredients in this troubled
world. When that happens the lawyer's work may be less but the
opportunities for Japan and for foreign investors will be vastly greater.
205 COMMERCIAL CODE, arts. 341-5, 222-5.
209 It is generally agreed that this provision is mandatory and cannot be waived by
the company, OHTORi, TENKAN SHASAI (Convertible Debentures), 5 KAUSIKI
KAISHA Ho KOZA 1752 (1961) and Yazawa, supra note 192.
210 Permitted by article 224-2 of the CODE.
211 See DuBois, Kawasaki, Sony and Shin-U.S. Investors Are Displaying a Grow-
ing Yen for Japanese Securities, BARRON's, at 5 (Feb. 11, 1963), where future possible
candidates are named and the popularity of the previous Japanese issues in the United
States is explained.
212 "Japanese Offering in London," 1 The Investor, No. 22, 9 (Oct. 25, 1962).
Honda Motors, in connection with its stock offering in the United States in December,
1962, made European Depositary Receipts (EDRs) available in London, following the
United States issue.
213 Samuelson, "How Strong Is Japan's Currency? Yen Strength Is Based on Rising
Productivity." The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, (English language weekly edition), Jan.
29, 1963, p. 8.
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